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APPEARANCE AND JURISDICTIONAL MOTIONS IN NEW YORK
ADOLF HOMBURGER AND JOSEPH LAUFER "'
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
N the American legal system adequate notice, a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and minimum contacts between the state and the defendant are es-
sential for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. It is generally assumed, how-
ever, that these prerequisites are intended for the protection of the individual
litigants alone and not the public at large. Hence it rests with the defendant to
protest that the process or its service is insufficient or that the contacts for the
assertion of judicial power over him or his property are inadequate.' This policy
of non-interference with the choice of the parties is obviously justified with
respect to the requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard since both
affect only private interests. It is less evident that the requisite of adequate con-
tacts should be left to the parties' discretion since the distribution of the case
load among the courts is a matter of public concern. Yet, the judges have no
say in the matter save for the limited reach of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens2 which they may invoke on their own initiative as a forum-denying
device.3 A court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter4 may acquire juris-
* Professors of Law, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. E.g., Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S. 421 (1808); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. 300 (1838);
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524 (1838); Farmer v. Nat'l Life Ass'n, 138 N.Y. 265, 33
N.E. 1075 (1893); Reed v. Chilson, 142 N.Y. 152, 36 N.E. 884 (1894); Everitt v. Everitt,
4 N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958).
2. The doctrine of forum non conveniens has received only limited recognition in the
United States. See Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
909, 1008 n.644 (1960), listing fourteen states which utilize the doctrine; Ehrenzweig, Con-
flict of Laws 121 n.2 (1962). In New York, the usefulness of the doctrine has been severely
limited by its rejection in actions brought by New York residents, Gross v. Cross, 28 Misc.
2d 375, 211 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Marx v. Katz, 20 Misc. 2d 1084, 195 N.Y.S.2d
867 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 A.D.2d 564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1st Dep't
1958). See De La Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949); Gregonis v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923). Additional
New York cases are cited in Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra at 122 n.S. It has also been rejected
in actions against New York residents, Vigil v. Cayuga Constr. Corp., 185 Misc. 675, 54
N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 934, 58 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st
Dep't 1945). Generally New York courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine in commercial
cases, Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 105 N.E.2d 623 (1952); Wertheim v. Clergue, 53 App. Div.
122, 126, 65 N.Y.S. 750, 753 (1st Dep't 1900). In view of recent developments in the area of
jurisdiction, our courts should free themselves from the shackles of this self-imposed limita-
tion. See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice (1963) ff 301.
3. Burdick v. Freeman, 120 N.Y. 420, 426, 24 N.E. 949, 950 (1890) (dictum); Justice
Jackson, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) emphasized that the doctrine
not only serves the litigant's private interest, but benefits the public: "Administrative diffi-
culties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being
handled at its origin." Today, the public aspect of the doctrine is more important than ever
because of the congestion besetting our courts and the expansion of jurisdiction through
long-arm statutes. See generally Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-
American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1929); Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 1008-13.
4. An objection based on lack of the court's subject matter jurisdiction, of course, may
be raised at any time, e.g., Davidsburgh v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 90 N.Y. 526 (1882).
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diction over the defendant's person or property simply by his consent. The act
which signifies this consent is called an appearance.5
When a defendant has been subjected to personal jurisdiction by process
that satisfies notice and contact requirements, his appearance lacks jurisdictional
significance.6 His subjection to jurisdiction was involuntary. However, absent
adequate contacts or notice, appearance serves as a substitute for either or
both; 7 for unless he presents jurisdictional objections to the court in the proper
manner and at the proper time his appearance cures all defects except lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.8 Practice statutes usually attach the effect of an
appearance to specific procedural steps. For example, the usual Code provision
declared that a defendant appears by serving a notice of appearance, an answer
or a demurrer. 9 Conversely, statutes may provide that certain procedural steps
shall not result in an appearance. For example, in New York a demand for serv-
ice of a complaint following service of a summons without complaint ° or a
motion to discharge an attachment does not constitute an appearance.1 ' How-
ever, the jurisdictional significance of many other procedural steps has not been
defined by statute; the task is left to the courts. Case law has developed a doc-
trine of informal appearance which attributes the effect of submission to juris-
diction to defendant's participating in the litigation as "an actor in a genuine
and substantial sense."'1 2 Thus, courts may acquire personal jurisdiction over a
defendant although he never formally appeared and indeed protested that he did
not wish to appear.13 Unfortunately, precedents do not always furnish a reliable
guide. For example, the courts in New York disagree over the question whether
a motion to extend the time to answer the complaint constitutes an appearance.' 4
While it is safe to say that participating in the action on the merits always
results in an informal appearance,' 5 it is not true that steps short of that never
do.1' Thus, a demand and later motion for a change of venue has been held to
5. See Restatement, judgments § 18 (1942).
6. In New York an appearance, whether timely or not, entities the defendant to
notice of all subsequent proceedings in the action, Martine v. Lowenstein, 68 N.Y. 456
(1877). See New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (1962) (effective Sept. 1, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as CPLRJ Rule 2103(e). Unless otherwise indicated, Rules and Sections
referred to herein are those of the CPLR.
7. "An appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of the summons
upon him." Rule 320(b). To the same effect, see former N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 237.
8. E.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N.Y. 428, 160 N.E. 775 (1928); Farmer v. Nat'l
Life Ass'n, 138 N.Y. 265, 33 N.E. 1075 (1893).
9. E.g., N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 421 (1877).
10. Section 3012(b).
11. Section 6222.
12. Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N.Y. 428, 433, 160 N.E. 775, 777 (1928).
13. Henderson v. Henderson, supra note 12. "[A] man may not say that he is not
properly before the court, and in the same breath argue that, if he be, there is no ground to
hold him," judge Learned Hand in Armstrong v. Langmuir, 6 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1925).
See 16 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 185, 192 (1950); Restatement, judgments § 19, comment b
(1942).
14. See infra note 61.
15. Farmer v. Nat'l Life Ass'n, 138 N.Y. 265, 270, 33 N.E. 1075, 1076 (1893), cited
with approval in Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J. B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 290 (1907).
16. See Restatement, Judgments § 19, comment b (1942).
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result in an appearance although these steps certainly do not involve the merits
of the case.
17
The technicality of the formal appearance, the vagueness of the doctrine of
informal appearance and the curative effect of an appearance on defects of basis
and notice have created vexing problems for defendants who wish to object to
improper exercise of jurisdiction without submitting to personal jurisdiction. At
the bottom of the difficulties experienced by the courts lies the postulate formerly
accepted as axiomatic that a defendant cannot combine substantial participation
in the litigation with an attack on the court's jurisdiction. The very concept of
an appearance which spells submission to jurisdiction was thought to be incom-
patible with a simultaneous challenge to that jurisdiction.' 8 This position was
understandable in the era of the Codes when the courts barred pleading of in-
consistent defenses and when alternative, conditional and hypothetical pleading
was generally considered improper.1 The problem, if viewed merely as an ex-
ercise in logic, has lost practical significance. Modern procedural pragmatism
finds nothing repugnant in the idea that a defendant may recognize a court's
power to determine the issue of personal jurisdiction while he submits, at the
same time, defenses on the merits should the court affirm its power.20 However,
there is substance in the argument that to permit a defendant to take this "in-
consistent position" is to defeat the policy of letting the same court determine
the entire controversy once the parties have invoked its power, if only for a
limited purpose. It is surely undesirable to expend time, effort and money on a
contest on the merits, only to have the trial court, or perhaps an appellate tri-
bunal pronounce in the end that the court lacked jurisdiction of defendant's per-
son. Hence it may be argued that once a court with jurisdiction of the subject
matter has heard the case, the substantive rights of the parties, rather than
technical questions of personal jurisdiction over the defendant should determine
whether the judgment should stand. The approach of American jurisdictions to
these problems varies depending upon their preference for one or the other of
conflicting policies and on judicial willingness to put aside formalism and dog-
matic adherence to tradition in response to overriding considerations of conven-
ience and fairness.
Extreme versions of logical purism are exemplified by one statute which
17. Dreskin v. Dreskin, 73 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The same is true of a motion
to dismiss based on plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue, Montgomery v. East Ridgelawn Ceme-
tary, 182 Misc. 562, 44 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 857, 50 N.Y.S.2d
843 (1st Dep't 1944), or seeking the removal of a cause commenced in the state court,
Farmer v. Nat'l Life Ass'n, 138 N.Y. 265, 33 N.E. 1075 (1893). But see General Inv. Co. v.
Lake Shore Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 288 (1922). Among procedural steps not held to constitute an
informal appearance have been: a demand for security for costs from a non-resident,
Wendel v. Connor, 220 App. Div. 211, 221 N.Y. Supp. 10 (Ist Dep't 1927) or a motion to
extend the time to answer merely incidental to a special appearance. See infra note 61.
18. See supra note 13.
19. See Clark, Code Pleading (2d ed. 1947) 254-58, 629-32; 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller,
op. cit. supra note 2, U] 3211.05. Cf. Rule 3014.
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(e); Rule 3014; 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra
note 2, ffff 3014.11, 3014.12, 3211.05.
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was in effect in Texas until 1962,21 and another which, subject to many excep-
tions, is still in effect in Mississippi.22 They deny altogether to a defendant the
right to appear in a pending litigation in order to question jurisdiction of his
person. Any appearance by him, even one confined expressly to contesting juris-
diction, results in the waiver of the very objection he seeks to raise. The only
course open to him is to suffer a judgment by default. He may later attack that
judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction should plaintiff seek to enforce
it in the same state or elsewhere. 3 The United States Supreme Court upheld
this type of statute in York v. TexasP4 on the questionable ground that due proc-
ess does not protect against mere procedural inconvenience. 25
. The traditional method of raising and preserving jurisdictional objections
before the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was a "special" ap-
pearance, as distinguished from the "general" appearancem 6 In its simple form
it is made solely to contest the court's jurisdiction over defendant's person or
property.2 7 The device was rationalized with an apologetic undertone by New
York's Judicial Council:
21. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 1242-1244 (1879), as construed by the Supreme Court of
Texas, abolished the special alpearance previously available there, York v. Texas, 73 Tex. 651,
11 S.W. 869 (1889). See Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031 B, The Texas
"Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; And the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas
and Elsewhere, 42 Texas L. Rev. 280, 292-97 (1964). Tex. R. Civ. P. 120 a (effective Sept. 1,
1962) aligned Texas with other "special appearance" type jurisdictions.
22. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1881, 1882 (1956) ; McCoy v. Watson, 154 Miss. 307, 310, 122
So. 368, 369 (1929). Mississippi is the lone American jurisdiction where this type of statute
survives. Even there many exceptions have been engrafted upon the rule, see Note, Special
Appearance in Mississippi, 19 Miss. L.J. 59 (1947).
23. See Hodges, Collateral Attacks on Judgments, 41 Texas L. Rev. 499, 505-11 (1963).
24. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
25. ". . . [M]ere convenience is not substance of right." Id. at 21. To speak of "mere
convenience" when defendant in order to raise the jurisdictional objection must first suffer
default is unrealistic. If defendant's position on the jurisdictional issue turns out to be
erroneous he has lost his case on the merits unless the court sees fit to relieve him of the
consequences of his default. This is quite apart from other harmful consequences which result
from the entry of a judgment against the defendant. See Note, Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 992-93 (1960).
26. E.g., Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878); Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney, 149
U.S. 194 (1893); Reed v. Chilson, 142 N.Y. 152, 36 N.E. 884 (1894). See Restatement,
Judgments § 20 (1942). For this dichotomy the mode of raising the objections is irrelevant.
Under local law the objection may be raised by motion to dismiss, motion to quash, demurrer,
special plea or the like. The common denominator is the necessity to confine the objection
to the jurisdictional ground and to raise it before contesting the merits of the claim. Thus,
e.g., under the early New York practice the objection that the defendant is not subject to
the court's jurisdiction, if it appeared on the face of the complaint, was raised by a "special"
demurrer which was limited to the jurisdictional question. Ogdensburgh & L.C.R.R. v.
Vermont & C.R.R., 16 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 249, 254 (1874). See 16 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep.
185, 206-13 (1950). After 1921 the same objection was raised by motion under Rule 106
of the Rules of Civ. Prac. and after 1951 by motion under Civ. Prac. Act § 237-a. California
uses the motion to quash, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.3. For an exhaustive survey of
statutory procedures for challenging jurisdiction in the United States see Thode, supra
note 21.
27. For example, former N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 237-a provided: "[A] defendant may
make a special appearance solely to object to the court's jurisdiction over his person." The
section permitted the defendant to join with his jurisdictional motion an objection to the
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter. Iowa R. Civ. P. 66 provides: "A defendant
may appear specially for the sole purpose of attacking the jurisdiction of the court, but only
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[S]ince the defendant could abstain from coming into the court
at all and yet subsequently move to vacate or modify any judgment,
without making a general appearance, he might as well-and with
more justice, since he avoids the prejudicial effect of a judgment
against him-be permitted to come into court before judgment
entered 2 8
Under the special appearance doctrine jurisdictional objections are treated dif-
ferently than all other objections and defenses. They may be asserted only as a
separate issue, distinct from and ahead of all others. This separateness must be
one of form, through the use of a prescribed method, and one of substance,
through the avoidance of commingling the jurisdictional issue with others
whether or not they go to the merits of the controversy.2 9 Thus the join-
der of jurisdictional objections with other objections and defenses waives the
former and constitutes a general appearance.
30
The special appearance has the evident advantage of clarity and simplicity.
before his general appearance." ll. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 20 (Smith-Hurd 1956) provides:
"Prior to filing any other pleading or motion, a special appearance may be made ... for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant ....
Every appearance, prior to judgment, not in compliance with the foregoing is a general
appearance." See also Ala. Code tit. 7, § 226 (1958) ; Pa. R. Civ. P. 1017.19. Many jurisdic-
tions adopted the Field Code's demurrer practice, but in fact created by case law a "special
plea" or special appearance practice for the sole purpose of challenging the court's jurisdiction
over the defendant. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672
(1937); Robinson v. Bossinger, 195 Ark. 445, 112 S.W.2d 637 (1938); Behr v. Duling, 128
Neb. 860, 260 N.W. 281 (1935); O'Hara v. Frederickson Bldg. Corp., 166 Neb. 206, 88
N.W.2d 643 (1958); Kansas, 0. & G. Ry. v. Smith, 190 Okla. 103, 125 P.2d 180 (1942);
Southard v. Oil Equip. Corp., 296 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1956).
28. 16 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 185, 197-98 (1950). The rule is summarized in Reed v.
Chilson, 142 N.Y. 152, 155, 36 N.E. 884, 885 (1894):
When a party does not intend to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the court
he must appear specially for the purpose of raising the question of jurisdiction by
motion, or he may allow the plaintiff to go on and take judgment by default
without affecting his rights, since no judgment entered without service of process
in some form could bind the defendant, and the question of jurisdiction would
protect him at any stage of the proceedings for its enforcement, provided it has not
been waived by his own act.
A motion to set aside a default judgment does not constitute a general appearance, e.g.,
Seymour v. Judd, 2 N.Y. 464 (1849).
29. Former N.Y. Civil Prac. Act § 237-a(1) provided in part:
[A] defendant may make a special appearance solely to object to the court's
jurisdiction over his person. Such objection ...must be raised by a motion to set
aside the service of process or to strike out part of the complaint, as may be ap-
propriate. The objection, if raised in a manner other than provided in the section
or if combined with an objection to the merits ... shall be deemed waived.
The statutes and rules of other states contain similar provisions. E.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 120(a)
provides: "Every appearance, prior to judgment, not in compliance with this rule is a general
appearance"; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 § 20(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956): "Every appearance, prior
to judgment, not in compliance with the foregoing is a general appearance."
30. See, e.g., Matter of Atterbury, 222 N.Y. 355, 362, 118 N.E. 858, 860 (1918); Ex
parte Forbell, 82 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1948); 39th-4Oth Corp. v. Port of N.Y. Authority,
188 Misc. 657, 65 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See 2 Carmody's N.Y. Practice § 758 (2d cd.
1930). Likewise, the service of an answer even though it raises only jurisdictional questions
may constitute a general appearance. See Brainard v. Brainard, 272 App. Div. 575, 74
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 916, 79 N.E.2d 744 (1948); cf. Carnegie
v. Carnegie, 274 App. Div. 887, 83 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1st Dep't 1948); Nones v. Hope Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 5 How. Pr. 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). For a discussion of these cases, see 16 N.Y.
Jud. Council Rep. 185, 200-04, 208 (1950).
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In its undiluted form it enables the court to determine once and for all the issue
of jurisdiction over the defendant's person or property before it tackles any other
aspect of the litigation. Its disadvantage lies in its undue formalism. The waiver
of the objection by failure to use the special appearance in the manner and for
the purpose prescribed may be a threat to the uninitiated.3 "A misstep can and
probably will result in a holding that the defendant has made a general appear-
ance in the action, thus submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court for
all purposes, despite his efforts to avoid doing that very thing."32 Also, isolating
the jurisdictional aspects of a controversy may at times be difficult and waste-
ful. This is particularly true since the evolution of long-arm statutes which
base jurisdiction on the nature and locale of the transaction. 33 Finally, many ju-
risdictions which adopted the device of a special appearance did not maintain it
in its pure form; they permitted a defendant, after denial of a motion raising a
jurisdictional objection on a special appearance, to proceed to litigate the action
on the merits without forfeiting that objection in the event of an appeal. 34 In
adopting this rule they preferred a policy of limiting the number of appeals over
a policy aimed at avoiding useless trials by a court without jurisdiction. Once
that step had been taken it became, of course, difficult to justify a special ap-
pearance on the ground of procedural economy.
Modern procedure following the lead of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure has abandoned the traditional distinction between a special and general
appearance.35 The defendant is no longer required "[to intone] at the door of
the . . . courthouse . . . that ancient abracadabra of the law, de bene esse, in
order by its magic power to enable himself to remain outside even while he steps
within." 36 It is now entirely proper to combine jurisdictional objections with
31. See, e.g., Reed v. Chilson, 142 N.Y. 152, 36 N.E. 884 (1894) (service of a notice of
retainer is a general appearance) ; Brainard v. Brainard, supra note 30 (service of an answer
containing only a jurisdictional objection results in waiver of objection); Perlak v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (appearance limited "to
the monetary extent of any attachment" stricken as sham).
32. 16 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 67 (1950).
33. The same question of fact may be jurisdictionally as well as substantively signi-
ficant: for example, whether defendant committed the acts within the state on which plain-
tiff's cause of action is based. See Rule 302(a), infra note 57; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d
378, 393, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957). The determination of the jurisdictional issue in
plaintiff's favor does not preclude relitigation of the same question as bearing upon the
issue of defendant's ultimate liability. Thus, it may be necessary to produce the same
evidence twice in court. See Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 302.09.
34. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 479 (1878); Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Gold-
berg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 391, 171 N.E. 579, 581 (1930):
[T]he rule is well established . . . that, when there is seasonable protest or dis-
claimer in response to a claim of jurisdiction, the protest or disclaimer is not nullified
by proceeding thereafter to a hearing on the merits.
Cf. Restatement, Judgments § 19, comment d (1942).
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139
F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944). See 2 Moore, Federal Practice
i 12.12, at 2262-63 (2d ed. 1964). For state jurisdictions which have adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure see 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8
(Wright ed. 1960); Thode, supra note 21, at 284.
36. Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944).
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others, whether on the merits or not.37 Defendant's appearance of itself does not
defeat the right to present jurisdictional objections; on the contrary, his appear-
ance is necessary in order to raise them. However, like other objections and
defenses which may be waived they are lost by defendant's failure to assert them
timely.38 Thus the modern approach has changed the function of an appearance.
What was once consent to jurisdiction over the person is now no more than sub-
mission to judicial power to determine jurisdiction. Hence it is no longer true
that a defendant -who has appeared cannot thereafter question the courts juris-
diction over his person or property; 9 but it should still be true that, once he
has appeared, he can no longer question the court's power to determine the issue
of jurisdiction. If he defaults after an appearance, he has lost the jurisdictional
objection by failure to raise it timely. And, since he has appeared, he should no
longer be able to challenge collaterally the court's power, called into being by
his appearance, to determine the jurisdictional issue.
40
In adopting this modern approach the procedural reformer should not lose
sight of the policy which favors the disposition of jurisdictional issues ahead of
any others. The predisposition of these issues can be enforced by appropriate
timing provisions which need not be related to the act of appearance. For exam-
ple, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the defendant, if he makes a
pre-answer motion for an accelerated judgment, to include in it available juris-
dictional objections. 41
How is this general evolution mirrored in the history of New York's law of
procedure? A strange disparity existed between statutory and case law for a
period of approximately one hundred years from the adoption of the Field Code
until the enactment of Civil Practice Act section 237-a in 1951. As originally
conceived by Field, the treatment of jurisdictional objections approached closely
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b): "No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one
or more other defenses or objection in a responsive pleading or motion." See Moore, op.
cit. supra note 35, 11 12.12, at 2260.
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). See Emerson v. National Cylinder Gas Co., 131 F. Supp.
299 (D. Mass. 1955). See Moore, op. cit supra note 35, g 12.23.
39. Contrast Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N.Y. 428, 160 N.E. 775 (1928); Reed v.
Chilson, 142 N.Y. 152, 36 N.E. 884 (1894); Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721
(1951); Everitt v. Everitt, 4 N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958) (all holding
that under New York's former special appearance rule a general formal or informal appear-
ance waives all objections to jurisdiction over the person) with cases decided under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) which hold to the contrary: Devine v. Griffenhagen, 31 F. Supp. 624 (D. Conn.
1940); Alford v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 3 F.R.D. 295 (S.D. Cal. 1944); Emerson
v. National Cylinder Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1955); Blank v. Bitker, 135 F.2d
962 (7th Cir. 1943); Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944). But see Fairhope Fabrics, Inc. v. Mohawk
Carpet Mills, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D. Mass. 1956).
40. Of course, if the defendant litigates the issue of jurisdiction over his person or
property he cannot attack an adverse determination collaterally even if it were erroneous.
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Vander v. Casperson,
12 N.Y.2d 56, 187 N.E.2d 109, 236 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1962). See Restatement, Judgments § 9
(1942).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (g) and (h). There is, however, disagreement as to whether
defendant may in his answer assert a defense which he failed to include in a prior motion
under Rule 12. See 1A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 370, at 521-25
(Wright ed. 1960).
APPEARANCE AND JURISDICTIONAL MOTIONS
modern concepts of the function of an appearance. The 1848 Code of Procedure
listed among the grounds for demurring to a complaint, when a defect ap-
peared on its face, the objection that "the court has no jurisdiction of the per-
son of the defendant.14 2 When the defect did not appear on the face of the
complaint the objection could be taken by answer.43 If the defendant did not
object either by demurrer or answer he was deemed to have waived all jurisdic-
tional objections save the one to the court's jurisdiction over the subject of the
action. 44 Thus, the statutory language seemed to permit a defendant to rely in
his demurrer on lack of jurisdiction of the person along with any other ground
enumerated in the Code, e.g., failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. Also, under the wording of the Code, when the jurisdictional defect
did not appear on the face of the complaint, the defendant could assert the defect
in his answer, together with defenses to the merits and denials, even though he
had previously demurred to the complaint on some other ground and thus had
appeared. Finally the broad language of the Code could very well have been
interpreted as including objections to the process or its sufficiency, in addition to
the objection that the defendant was not subject to the court's jurisdiction. In
fact, the present New York Rule uses the language of the Field Code to cover
both types of objections. 45
The real trouble-maker in the statutory scheme was Code section 139. The
last sentence of that section provided: "A voluntary appearance of a defendant
is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him." It is interesting to
note that the provision did not appear in the Code as drafted originally.4 It was
added in 1851. 4 7 If that provision is taken literally, it renders nugatory all other
provisions of the Code governing the raising of jurisdictional objections; for both
the demurrer and the answer constituted an appearance,48 and therefore would
bring about the very thing the defendant -tried to avoid, namely to submit
to the court's jurisdiction over his person. Obviously this could not have been
the intent of the legislature. Rather, the provision, read in the light of the stat-
utory scheme, should have been construed as qualified by the other provisions of
the Code. In other words, a voluntary appearance should have been deemed the
equivalent of personal service of the summons, subject, however, to the right
42. N.Y. Code of Proc. § 122 (1848).
43. N.Y. Code of Proc. § 126 (1848).
44. N.Y. Code of Proc. § 127 (1848).
45. Rule 3211(a) (8). See 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 152 (1958).
46. N.Y. Code of Proc. § 139 (1849) provided: "From the time of the service of the
summons in a civil action, or the allowance of a provisional remedy, the court shall be
deemed to have acquired jurisdiction, and to have control of all subsequent proceedings."
The section was amended by Laws 1851, ch. 479, which added the last sentence quoted in
the text. Final Rep. Comm'rs on Prac. and Pl., (Ass. Doc. No. 16) at 262 (1850) briefly
explains: "Amended Code § 139. Enlarged, so as to include a voluntary appearance without
service of process." Surely these words do not disclose an intent to change the entire statutory
scheme. Rather they seem to convey the idea that a voluntary appearance, whether formal
or informal, confers upon the court the power to determine all issues, including those
pertaining to jurisdiction over the person.
47. See supra note 46.
48. See N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 421 (1877).
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confirmed by the other sections to challenge jurisdiction. The substance of the
Code provisions with some changes and additions found their way into the Code
of Civil Procedure49 and finally into the Civil Practice Act and Rules of Civil
Practice. 0 The latter replaced the Code demurrer by a motion "raising an objec-
tion in point of law" and permitted the use of affidavits in support of jurisdic-
tional defects that did not appear on the face of the complaint.
Superimposed upon the statutes was the case law which paid scant attention
to the design of the Code. With typical unconcern for some of the Field Code's
innovations the courts continued the old device of a special appearance which
pre-dated the Code.& 5 1 The provision allowing a demurrer on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction of the defendant's person was interpreted as limited to
the case where the defendant was a person "not subject" to the court's jurisdic-
tion.52 Under the early decisions the objection had to be raised by demurrer or,
if the defect did not appear on the face of the complaint, in the answer. On the
other hand, when the objection was directed to the process or its sufficiency the
defendant, in order to preserve it, had to raise it by motion to set aside the serv-
ice of the summons, appearing especially for that purpose.53 Eventually both
objections, the one to the process or its sufficiency and the other that the defend-
ant was not subject to the court's jurisdiction, were thrown into one basket,
namely the motion objecting to the court's jurisdiction over his person. However,
in keeping with the concept of the special appearance, the defendant was com-
pelled to limit the motion strictly to the jurisdictional ground or face the con-
sequences of a waiver. 54 In 1951, Civil Practice Act section 237-a eliminated the
incongruity between statutory and case law. That section codified and clarified
the case law and thus gave statutory recognition to the special appearance.as
The section remained in effect until the adoption of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules in 1962.56
49. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 421, 424, 488, 498, 499 (1877).
50. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 237, 278 (1921); N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac. 106(1), 107(1)
(1921).
51. E.g., Van Deusen & Forest v. Hayward, 17 Wend. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
52. E.g., Nones v. Hope Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 How. Pr. 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850);
Ogdensburgh & L.C.R.R. v. Vermont & C.R.R., 63 N.Y. 176, 181 (1875). But see, e.g.,
Hamburger v. Baker, 35 Hun. 455 (N.Y. 1st Dep't 1885). For a detailed analysis of the con-
flicting case law under the Codes, see 16 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 185, 206-13 (1950).
53. See 3 Carmody's N.Y. Practice 2248-49 (2d ed. 1930); Webb, Elements of
Practice 101 (1926); Bradbury, Topical Index Digest of the N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act & Rules
Civ. Prac. 164-67 (1921).
54. "It is, therefore, apparently the law in New York that an objection under sub-
division 1 of Rules 106 [no jurisdiction of the defendant's person, a defect that appears on
the face of the complaint] and 107 [no jurisdiction of the defendant's person, a defect that
does not appear on the fact of the complaint], as well as an objection to the sufficiency
of process or its service, must be raised by motion on a special appearance or be deemed
waived." 16 Jud. Council Rep. 185, 213 (1950).
55. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 237-a, added by Laws 1951, ch. 729. In addition to clarifying
the existing case law, CPA § 237-a relaxed prior law by permitting joinder of ob-
jections to the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and the defendant's person. CPA
237-a(2). It also clarified the procedure where the defendant sought both in rem and in
personam relief.
56. See supra note 6.
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II. BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE CPLR57
1. Raising Jurisdictional Objections in Actions In Personam
As far as actions in personam are concerned, New York has flatly rejected
the special appearance. It has divorced the concept of the appearance from any
notion of waiver of jurisdictional objections. Thus the ancient distinction
57. These provisions, so far as here pertinent, read:
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries.
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause
of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner
as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
(b) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon this
section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction with respect to causes of
action not arising from an act enumerated in this section.
§ 314. Service without the state not giving personal jurisdiction in certain actions.
Service may be made without the state by any person authorized by section 313
in the same manner as service is made within the state:
1. in a matrimonial action; or
2. where a judgment is demanded that the person to be served be excluded from
a vested or contingent interest in or lien upon a specific real or personal
property within the state; or that such an interest or lien in favor of either
party be enforced, regulated, defined or limited; or otherwise affecting the
title to such property, including an action of interpleader or defensive
interpleader; or
3. where a levy upon property of the person to be served has been made within
the state pursuant to an order of attachment or a chattel of such person
has been seized in an action to recover a chattel.
Rule 320. Defendant's appearance.
(a) Requirement of appearance. The defendant appears by serving an answer or
a notice of appearance, or by making a motion which has the effect of extending
the time to answer ....
(b) When appearance confers personal jurisdiction, generally. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (c), an appearance of the defendant is equivalent to
personal service of the summons upon him, unless an objection to jurisdiction
under paragraph eight of subdivision (a) of rule 321.1 is asserted by motion or in
the answer.
(c) When appearance confers personal jurisdiction, in certain actions. In a case
specified in section 314 where the court's jurisdiction is not based upon personal
service on the defendant an appearance is not equivalent to personal service of the
summons upon the defendant if an objection to jurisdiction under paragraphs eight
or nine of subdivision (a) of rule 3211, or both, is asserted at the time of ap-
pearance by motion or in the answer, unless the defendant proceeds with the defense
after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the objection is not ultimately
sustained.
Rule 3211. Motion to dismiss.
(a) Motion to dismiss cause of action. A party may move for judgment dis-
missing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that:
2. the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause of action;
or
8. the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant; or
9. the court has not jurisdiction in an action where service was made under
section 314 or 315 ....
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between a general and a special appearance has become obsolete. Henceforth,
defendant may preserve his objections to jurisdiction over his person simply
by raising them timely. 8 The media for presenting the objections are either
a pre-answer motion under Rule 3211 or the answer. It is immaterial whether
the defendant challenges jurisdiction at the time of his appearance or there-
after. However, he loses the objections to jurisdiction over his person (like
other dilatory pleas and defenses to the merits) by his failure to assert them
timely by motion or in his answer.59 He may freely join other objections and
defenses, including those going to the merits, with his jurisdictional objections.0 0
The risk that an inadvertent informal appearance will subject him to personal
jurisdiction has been greatly lessened; for like a formal appearance the informal
appearance will no longer spell his irrevocable submission to the court's juris-
diction if he challenges it seasonably. The point bears illustration.
Assume that a non-resident, sued in New York, moves to extend the time
to answer. Undoubtedly this motion does not constitute a formal appearance.00,
(c) Evidence permitted; immediate trial; motion treated as one for summary
judgment. Upon the hearing of a motion made under subdivision (a) or (b), either
party may submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for
summary judgment and the court may treat the motion as a motion for summary
judgment. The court may order immediate trial of the issues raised on the motion.
(e) Number, time and waiver of objections; motion to plead over. At any
time before service of the responsive pleading is required, a party may move on one
or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a), and no more than one such
motion shall be permitted. Any objection or defense based upon a ground set
forth in subdivision (a) is waived unless raised either by such motion or in the
responsive pleading, except that a motion based upon a ground specified in
paragraphs two, seven or ten of subdivision (a) may be made by motion at any
subsequent time or in a later pleading, if one is permitted . . . . (f) Extension of
time to plead. Service of a notice of motion under subdivision (a) or (b) before
service of a pleading responsive to the cause of action or defense sought to be dis-
missed extends the time to serve the pleading until ten days after service of notice of
entry of the order.
58. Rule 320(b); Rule 3211(e). See 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 152-53 (1958); 4 N.Y.
Adv. Comm. Rep. 187 (1960).
May a defendant who failed to assert a jurisdictional objection in the answer seek
leave to include the objection in an amended answer? One writer suggests that this leave
could not be given, but that the defendant should be able to include the objection in an
answer amended as of right, McLaughlin, Practice Commentary to Rule 320, McKinney's
CPLR (Supp. 1964). While it is true that the courts should not favor a belated assertion of
jurisdictional objections, the court dearly has the power to allow the amendment under
Rule 3025, if good and sufficient cause for the delay is shown. Cf. 1A Barron & Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 370, n.80 (Wright ed. 1960). However, the court would
have no power to grant leave to amend under Rule 3211(e), as proposed by the Judicial
Conference, where the defendant made a pre-answer motion without raising the jurisdictional
objection. See note 59, infra.
59. At the present time defendant may raise jurisdictional objections for the first time
in his anwer even though he earlier made a motion under Rule 3211 based on non-
jurisdictional objections. He will no longer be able to do so under amendments to Rules
320(b) and (c) and 3211(e) proposed by the N.Y. Judicial Conference pursuant to N.Y.
Judiciary Law § 229. The amendments will become effective September 1, 1965, unless dis-
approved by the legislature. These amendments, their background and effect are discussed in
the text infra pp. 400-06.
60. 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 152-53 (1958).
60a. A formal appearance, equivalent to personal service of the summons and sufficient
to avoid default, if seasonable, is made under Rule 320(a): (1) by serving an answer; (2)
by serving a notice of appearance; or (3) "by making a motion which has the effect of
384
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However, it may constitute an informal appearance. 61 If it does, the defend-
ant under New York's former special appearance statute would have irretriev-
ably lost the opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction over his person
or property. This is no longer true. Under the present rule it is clear that he
may contest jurisdiction in personam seasonably by motion or in his answer
notwithstanding his earlier informal appearance. Still it would not be correct
to say that defendant "loses nothing" by appearing.62 As suggested in the
Introduction, by his appearance he validated, as it were, plaintiff's choice of a
forum at least for the purpose of litigating the issue of jurisdiction. In most
cases, however, a mere application for an extension of time to answer should
not be deemed even an informal appearance.0 3 A defendant who moves for an
extension frequently does so because he has not yet decided whether he should
submit the jurisdictional question to this court or whether he should default
and challenge jurisdiction after entry of a judgment by default. On the other
hand, on occasion defendant's conduct may fairly indicate his intent to litigate
the jurisdictional question in the court to which he applied for the extension.
For example, in addition to moving for the extension, he may have taken
plaintiff's deposition on jurisdictional and other issues of the controversy.
64
extending the time to answer." The quoted phrase is a substitute for the phrase "a notice
of motion raising an objection to the complaint in point of law" which appeared in the
corresponding provision of the Civil Practice Act. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 237. The change
sought to make it clear that any kind of motion that extends the time to appear should
suffice to avoid a default. See 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 185 (1960). The phrase "a motion
which has the effect of extending the time to answer" refers only to motions which have the
automatic "built in" effect of extending the time to answer. See, e.g., Rule 3024(c) providing
that a corrective motion extends the time to serve the responsive pleading. On the other hand,
a motion to extend the time to answer, which is granted does not constitute "a motion which
has the effect of extending the time to answer." No automatic extension results from the
making of such motion; the order of the court, granting it, and not the motion, extends the
time to answer. See Note, 37 St. John's L. Rev. 285, 321-22 (1963).
61. Pre-CPLR cases distinguished between applications for extension of time to plead
that were incidental to a jurisdictional objection and those made in the context of conduct
disclosing an intent to contest the claim on the merits. The former were deemed consistent
with a special appearance and thus preserved the jurisdictional objections: Maushart v.
Kelly, 10 A.D.2d 630, 196 N.Y.S.2d 935 (2d Dep't 1960); Drake v. Shenandoah Pottery,
Inc., 141 Misc. 471, 252 N.Y. Supp. 705 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1930). The latter amounted
to a general appearance and waived all objections to the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant: Capuano v. Zolla, 10 Misc. 2d 96, 174 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Hammond v. Hammond, 9 A.D.2d 615, 190 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1959); Hecht v.
Occhipinti Realty Co., 254 App. Div. 96, 38 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 278 N.Y.
724, 17 N.E.2d 141 (1938). These decisions were in accord with the doctrine of special ap-
pearance which does not permit a defendant to present defenses on the merits along with
jurisdictional objections. With the demise of the special appearance these cases have lost
precedential value. The question whether a defendant by his conduct submitted the
jurisdictional issue to the court should be distinguished from the question, relevant under
former law, whether the defendant by his conduct waived all jurisdictional objections.
62. See Devine v. Griffenhagen, 31 F. Supp. 624 (D. Conn. 1940) (defendant "loses
nothing" by filing a general appearance); 1A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 370, at 514-15 (Wright ed. 1960): "Thus if in accordance with local practice
counsel enters an 'appearance' but, within the time prescribed by this rule [Fed. R. Civ.
P. 121, files a motion challenging . . . jurisdiction, his general appearance waives nothing."
See also id. § 370, at 517-20.
63. Restatement, Judgments § 19, comment b (1942).
64. Under Rule 3106 a defendant may examine the plaintiff before he answers the
complaint. See 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, II 3106.07. Whether an
385
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No better rule can be suggested for solving this problem than the old one which
lets each claim of an informal appearance rest on its own facts; these will reveal
the degree of defendant's participation in the lawsuit.0
2. Appearance in Actions In Rem6
The simplicity and clarity which distinguish New York's rules of appear-
ance in actions in personam are missing in actions in rein. An'incongruous
provision reminiscent of the former special appearance rule requires the defend-
ant in these actions to raise jurisdictional objections at the time of his appear-
ance. It is gratifying that the Judicial Conference has now proposed an amend-
ment to remove this disturbing feature of the lawY In all other respects
the rules governing the raising and waiver of jurisdictional objections in actions
in rein are the same as in actions in personam.
The CPLR prides itself on having pioneered a separate objection to
jurisdictional defects in in rem actions. Rule 3211 (a) (8) deals with lack of
jurisdiction of the defendant's person while Rule 3211(a) (9) covers lack of
in rem jurisdiction. The two paragraphs in turn are separated by five non-
jurisdictional objections from the one covering lack of subject matter juris-
diction.6 8 Despite the physical separation of these three types of objections
their respective reach is by no means certain. The distinction between lack of
subject matter jurisdiction (not waivable) and lack of in rein jurisdiction
(waivable) is often problematical since the absence of a res not only destroys
the basis for jurisdiction in rem, but also deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction. 69 Defendant may also find it difficult to choose between an objection
under subdivisions 8 and 9 where plaintiff has sought in personarn relief although
he obtained only in rem jurisdiction. Professors Weinstein, Korn and Miller
suggest that "the tenuousness of these distinctions and the novelty of the
provisions suggest that at least until experience clarifies the practice, a
defendant would be wise to move under both paragraphs 8 and 9 in cases of
doubt."7 0 It may even be questioned whether the traditional classification of
claims in personam, in rem and quasi in rem is still useful. Our courts have
sustained jurisdiction over non-residents in cases which do not fit neatly into
informal appearance waived jurisdictional objections became an issue in a federal court when
defendant took plaintiff's deposition and simultaneously obtained extensions of time to
answer. Later, in his timely answer, he raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue, in addition to defenses on the merits. The court correctly held that under Federal Rule
12(b) and (h) he had not waived the objections. Blank v. Bitker, 135 F.2d 962 (7th Cir.
1943).
65. See text accompanying notes 12-17, supra.
66. The terms action in rem and jurisdiction in rem are used in this article in their
broadest sense to include quasi in rem actions and jurisdiction.
67. See text infra pp. 400-02.
68. See 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, 11 3211.21. The objections
originally were combined in one subdivision; see 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 152 (1958).
They were separated for the first time in Final N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. A-464 (Advance
Draft 1961).
69. Rule 3211(a) (2) quoted supra note 57.
70. 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, II 3211.22.
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any of the traditional categories. Thus jurisdiction over non-residents was
upheld in a proceeding brought by the trustees of a common trust fund for
judicial settlement of their accounts.71 And in interpleader actions a stake-
holder may now secure his discharge after he has segregated, with the court's
permission, the contested fund.7 2 Hence one may wonder if the framing of
separate objections directed to one or the other type of jurisdictional issues
does not represent a reversion to the conceptualism of yesterday.75
The problem of raising and waiving jurisdictional objections in actions
in rem must be distinguished sharply from the question of what effect an
appearance has in these actions. The question there is whether a defendant
who has appeared, but has not challenged the court's jurisdiction over his
property or who has challenged it unsuccessfully, necessarily subjects himself
by his appearance to the court's jurisdiction over his person. That problem will
be discussed next.
3. Limited Appearance Eliminated
The CPLR outlaws the so-called "limited appearance. 7 4 A special appear-
ance should not be confused with a limited appearance. The former is a proce-
71. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mr. justice
Jackson, speaking for the majority, observed, at 312-13: "Judicial proceedings to settle
fiduciary accounts have been sometimes termed in rem or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or
more vaguely still, 'in the nature of a procedure in rem'. It is not readily apparent how the
courts of New York did or would classify the present proceeding, which has some character-
istics and is wanting in some features of proceedings both in rem and in personam. But in
any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive
and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary
from state to state. Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between actions in
rem and those in personam in many branches of law, or on other issues, or the reasoning
which underlies them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort to constructive service
in this proceeding upon how its court or this Court may regard this historic antithesis ... 
72. CPLR 314(2), 1006(f).
73. See infra notes 92, 94; see also Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 Pac.
960 (1957), cert. denied, appeals dismissed, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); Tyler v. Judges of the
Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 53 N.E. 812, 814 (1900).
74. This, at any rate, was dearly intended by the Revisers. 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep.
187-89 (1960). Professor Lenhoff has suggested that they failed to accomplish this purpose.
He put the case of a defendant who has successfully asserted an objection to personal
jurisdiction in a case specified in § 314. Even if he proceeds with the defense of the in rem
aspect of plaintiff's claim, is he not within the saving clause of § 320(c): "[A]n appearance
is not equivalent to personal service of the summons upon the defendant if an objection
to jurisdiction under . . . [paragraph) eight . . . is asserted . . . unless the defendant
proceeds with the defense and the objection is not ultimately sustained"? Lenhoff, A New
Procedural Code in New York, 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 119, 128 (1963). The question raised
by Professor Lenhoff may yet prove troublesome, particularly in view of the awkward
phrasing of § 320(c) with its involved double negative. Of course, it would be incongruous
to sanction a limited appearance where defendant successfully asserts an objection to in
personam jurisdiction but to deny it where he simply resists an in rem claim on the merits.
The problem of the limited appearance in New York before the enactment of § 237-a
of the N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act was thoroughly examined by Frumer, Jurisdiction and Limited
Appearance in New York: Dilemma of the Non-Resident Defendant, 18 Fordham L. Rev.
73 (1949); and Frumer & Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Non-Resident Defendant
in New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 125 (1950); 16 Jud. Council Rep.
185, 200-04 (1950); see also 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 187-89 (1960); see generally Note,
Special Appearances to Contest the Merits in Attachment Suits, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 403
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dural device enabling a defendant to appear solely for the purpose of raising
the jurisdictional question. A limited appearance, on the other hand, seeks
to avoid the transformation of in rem jurisdiction into personal jurisdiction
by a defense on the merits. This effect is averted by permitting the defendant
to appear "for purposes of litigating the merits but limited to those claims
which could be constitutionally adjudicated by the court in his absence by
virtue of its in rem jurisdiction." 75 It is apparent from the preceding definitions
of the special and the limited appearances that both serve to avoid the proce-
dural consequences of a submission to personal jurisdiction; at the same time,
both confer upon a court the power to determine, with binding effect upon the
parties, a limited segment of their dispute. In the case of a special appearance
the determination is confined to the issue of the court's jurisdiction over defend-
ant's person or property. In the case of a limited appearance the court will
determine the substantive rights of the parties but the determination will
reach no further than the court's control over defendant's property or status.
4. "Restricted Appearance" Created
While the CPLR put an end to both the special and the limited appear-
ances, as here defined, it created a new species of appearances: under Section
302(a) personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant may be based on
his transaction of any business, his tortious conduct, or his ownership use or
possession of real property, all within the state.70 In that event, under Section
302(b), his appearance confers jurisdiction solely over causes of action, that
arise from one or the other of the enumerated local activities. As is true
of the special and the limited appearance, this statutory curb averts what
would otherwise be the normal, procedural consequence of defendant's ap-
pearance, i.e., his subjection to the court's unrestricted in personam power.
Long-armed as it is, the novel jurisdiction is not permitted to reach beyond
causes of action arising from defendant's local contacts which, under the
statute, created jurisdiction in the first place. In other words, the particular
basis of the long-arm jurisdiction qualifies its scope. For want of an accepted
term and to distinguish it from both the special and the limited appearance,
defendant's appearance pursuant to the long-arm statute may be called a
"restricted appearance." For as already noted, it is restricted in the sense that
it subjects the defendant to jurisdiction only with respect to his specified
local contacts. In contrast, however, to the two other types of appearances,
this novel species need not be claimed by the defendant at the time of his
appearance; it operates restrictively on the court's jurisdiction as of course.
Although neither the draftsmen of the Illinois statute on which the New
(1940); Note, The "Right" to Defend Federal Quasi In Rem Actions Without Submitting
to the Personal Jurisdiction of the Court, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 441 (1963); Note, Limited
Appearances, 7 Utah L. Rev. 369 (1961).
75. Frumer & Graziano, loc. cit. supra note 74, at 125.
76. The Section is quoted supra note 57.
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York provision was patterned nor those responsible for Section 302 elaborate on
their reasons for creating the restricted appearance, these are plain enough.
7
7
In many, perhaps most instances of the long-arm jurisdiction it would be
evidently unfair to subject the non-resident defendant to the burden of
defending against additional claims that are unrelated to the specific "contact"
on which the novel jurisdiction is based. Indeed, the unfairness may be so gross
that subjecting the defendant to the prosecution of unrelated claims' might
deny him due process. Although the constitutional law on this problem is far
from developed,78 the draftsmen displayed sensible concern for defendant's
situation and its constitutional implications. This attitude may be contrasted
with the seeming unconcern for the comparable situation of a defendant who
is subjected to in rem jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 314.j9
Such a defendant may have no valid jurisdictional objections against the pro-
ceedings. If he decides not to default and instead "proceeds with the defense,"
i.e., litigates the merits of the claim asserted against the res, he becomes
subject to personal jurisdiction since a limited appearance is not permissible.
As a result, the defendant may be required to defend against any other cause
of action, related or not, asserted simultaneously or added later. This contrast
between the ban on the limited appearance ordained by Section 320(c) and
the simultaneous emergence of the restricted appearance in Rule 302 (b) gives
pause for thought.
First of all, what is the relation of Section 302(b) and Rule 320(c)? It
would seem that the restricted character of the long-arm jurisdiction overrides
the unlimited appearance contemplated by Rule 320 if the defendant proceeds
with the defense of an in rem claim. Were it otherwise, a non-resident subject
to in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm statute would be in a serious
jurisdictional predicament if the plaintiff attache defendant's New York prop-
erty: he could not choose to default since an in personam judgment, entitled
to full faith and credit elsewhere, would result; nor could he proceed with
the defense without exposing himself to unrestricted personal jurisdiction and
the assertion of claims unrelated to any local activity. This could not have
been the intent of the draftsmen80 since the defendant's free choice--i.e., either
77. "Subdivision (b) of CPLR 302 was added to clarify the limited nature of jurisdic-
tion obtained under subdivision (a)," 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2,
ff 302.15. The Joint Committee Comments on the parallel provisions of the Ill. Civ. Prac. Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(3) (Smith-Hurd, 1956), are equally brief: "[The provision]
prohibits the joinder of an action not arising from the "minimum contacts" of Subsection
(1), with an action arising out of these contacts. It should be closely adhered to so as to
avoid diluting the bases of jurisdiction defined in Subsection (1)." Id. at 170. Finally, the
Commissioners' Notes to § 1.03(b) of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act which embodies a parallel provision, do no more than state that it is designed "to
prevent assertion of independent claims unrelated to ... (the] activity" which gave rise to
the long-arm jurisdiction, 9 B Uniform Laws Ann. § 1.03 (Supp. 1964).
78. For authorities on the problem of ownership of property as basis for in personam
jurisdiction, see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 115-16 (4th ed. Scholes, 1964).
79. The text of the section is quoted supra note 57.
80. According to 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 302.15, Rule 320
must be read with the limitation set forth in Subdivision (b) of CPLR 302 in mind. Cf.
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to abandon the local res and thereby to preserve his insulation from personal
jurisdiction or to litigate the underlying claim on the merits and thereby to
submit to personal jurisdiction-is usually said to justify the ban on a limited
appearance.8'
However, the tension between the basic approaches embodied in the two
provisions just noted reaches deeper. In the heyday of Pennoyer v. Neff8 2 the
limited jurisdiction obtainable over a defendant's property usefully comple-
mented an in personam jurisdiction that was as yet narrowly circumscribed
by territorial and power concepts. Under the pressures of economic, social and
technological realities these concepts have lost their hold on judicial and
legislative thinking; the International Shoe88 case and the long-arm jurisdiction
spurred by it are symptomatic of the current trend. To a lesser extent, the
pressures toward wider jurisdictional bases which undermined Pennoyer v. Neff,
also affected judicial attitudes toward the complementary branch, i.e., in rem
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, the increasing "reification" of intangible
property, a semantic technique for expanding in ren jurisdiction has often
been noted.84 This trend reached an early highwater mark in Harris v. Balk85
which sanctioned jurisdiction for garnishment proceedings against a non-resident
although it was based merely on the fortuitous presence of his debtor within
the state.
The judicial and statutory decline of the "limited appearance" in attach-
ment cases is a related symptom: the early cases assumed that the defendant
in an in rem proceeding had the choice between abandoning the res to a default
judgment or litigating the claim underlying the seizure.8 1' If he appeared, the
effect of his appearance was limited. For if he lost, the judgment could not be
enforced beyond the value of the res nor was he subject to a deficiency judg-
ment.87 Furthermore, he remained free to litigate the merits on a later occasion.
On the other hand, if defendant won, the plaintiff was free to relitigate the
merits whenever he was later able to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant's
person or property.88 Gradually, however, the doctrine of limited appearance
lost ground. In a notable case, the court preserved the form but drained the
substance of the limited appearance by extending the reach of collateral
Homburger, Book Review, Weinstein, Korn & Miller New York Civil Practice, 112 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1222, 1232-33 (1964).
81. See, e.g., 2 Moore, Federal Practice ff 12.13, at 2264-65 (2d ed. 1964).
82. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
83. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84. See, e.g., Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants,
49 Yale L.J. 241 (1939); for a recent illustration in New York, see Estate of Riggle, 11
N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
85. 198 U.S. 215 (1923).
86. See, e.g., Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (6th
Cir. 1922); Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
87. The "long-standing practice" in New York of entering a default judgment in the
full amount of the complaint, although its effect is limited to the res, was disapproved in
Benadon v. Antonio, 10 A.D.2d 40, 43-44, 197 N.Y.S. 1, 5-6 (lst Dep't 1960).
88. For the notions underlying the limited appearance, see Cheshire Nat'l State Bank
v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
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estoppel8 9 Since defendant had litigated the merits of the underlying claim,
he was held collaterally estopped from relitigating any of the issues actually
contested in the first action. In other cases, the courts more forthrightly
rejected the privilege of a limited appearance altogether, thus forcing the
defendant either to abandon the res or to submit to unlimited in personain
jurisdiction.90 This, of course, is the approach now sanctified by Section 320.
This legislative ban on all limited appearances enacted without much
supporting explanation, 1 is cause for misgivings. First of all, the recent
developments in the field of in personam jurisdiction have profoundly affected
the function of its jurisdictional twin, i.e., the in rem jurisdiction. Even those
who are persuaded of its continuing utility 2 will concede that its proper role
will have to be redefined in light of the broad expansion of the in personam
jurisdiction. A pragmatic re-appraisal will, it is hoped, emerge from wide
judicial experimentation with modern jurisdictional concepts. This process,
by trial and error, should not be inhibited by a blanket rejection (nor,
for that matter, by a blanket endorsement) of the limited appearance. Recent
studies of the concept have emphasized the need to shun as elsewhere dogmatic
generalizations and instead to scrutinize and balance from type of case to type
of case the several interests and policy considerations which favor, or militate
against, a defendant's privilege to make a limited appearance.
93 The insights
gained into the real issues at stake in the rapid expansion of in personam
jurisdiction are only now beginning to be applied to the divergent situations
still indiscriminately grouped under the heading of in rein jurisdiction.
4
89. Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94
(1939), criticized by Taintor, Foreign Judgment in Rent: Full Faith and Credit v. Res
Judicata in Personam, 8 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 223; cf. United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298,
302 (2d Cir. 1956) ("[A] rule against personal jurisdiction will only bring on further litiga-
tion which the [defendant] . . . will lose on the merits by collateral estoppel or stare
decisis").
90. E.g., United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956) and federal cases
cited, id. at 302.
91. In substance, the draftsmen confined themselves to the following statement:
A rule prohibiting a limited appearance forces the defendant to choose between de-
faulting on the in rem claim or submitting to personal jurisdiction; on the other
hand, it affords a lever for obtaining personal jurisdiction over absent or non-
resident defendants, whereby all the claims between the parties may be settled at
one time and a multiplicity of suits avoided. 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. at 188 (1960).
92. For a forceful critique, see Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rent
Jurisdiction, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 303, 306-17 (1962); see also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 660, 663 (1959).
93. Frumer, Jurisdiction and Limited Appearance in New York: Dilemma of the Non-
Resident Defendant, 18 Fordham L. Rev. 73, 85 (1949); Frumer & Graziano, Jurisdictional
Dilemma of the Non-Resident Defendant in New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 Fordham
L. Rev. 125, 141 (1950); Note, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 403, 410 (1949); Note, Limited Ap-
pearances, 7 Utah L. Rev. 369, 374, 381 (1961).
94. It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem and in
personam, high time now in a mobile society where property increasingly becomes
intangible and the fictional res become stranger and stranger. Insofar as courts
remain given to asking "Res, res- who's got the res?", they cripple their evaluation
of the real factors that should determine jurisdiction.
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 663 (1959); Note,
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To some uncertain extent, this modem approach may explain the evident
ambiguity of New York's pre-CPLR case law which has never taken a final,
clear-cut stand for or against the limited appearancey 5 For this reason alone,
it would have been wiser for the CPLR to follow the example of the recently
amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on attachments and garnishments.
0
The federal amendments left the problem of the limited appearance to be dealt
with by case law.
97
The drastic surgery performed by the draftsmen of the CPLR on the
concept of "limited appearance" raises a further question. Has this approach
adequately dealt with the constitutional aspects of the problem? Those who
reject the limited appearance do so because they believe that re-litigating the
merits of the underlying cause of action in another tribunal is inconsistent
with the policy embodied in the doctrine of res judicata and economy of litigation
in general. 98 These considerations fail to note the hardships that may be created
for a defendant in certain situations. He may be forced to abandon the res
or to defend the underlying in personam claim in a foreign forum under cir-
cumstances which are clearly prejudicial to him.99 Nor is it proper to ignore
the opportunity opened to the plaintiff to pursue against an appearing defendant
totally unrelated causes of action. In light of these possible burdens on non-
resident defendants, serious constitutional arguments in favor of the "limited
appearance" have been advanced. 100 The most recent, comprehensive study on
jurisdiction considers the problem in connection with an attachment.10 1 It
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 956, 965, 966
(1960).
95. For a careful analysis of the New York cases until 1950, see the articles by Frumer
& Graziano, supra note 74. Among more recent cases, compare Burg v. Winquist, 124
N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Perlak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 675
(Sup. Ct. 1955) with Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 A.D.2d 3, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't
1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553 (1956); Mirabella v. Banco Industrial, 38 Misc.
2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1963).; Rothstein v. Autourist A/S, 40 Misc. 2d 522,
242 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Cf. for a case under the CPLR, Poly Repro Int'l Ltd. v.
Pacific Copy Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 235, 245 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
96. Rule 4(e) Fed. R. Civ. P., effective July 1, 1963.
97. Note, The "Right" to Defend Federal Quasi In Ren Actions Without Submitting
to the Personal Jurisdiction of the Court, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 441, 442 (1963). The Advisory
Committee's restraint may, in part, have been induced by doubts whether, under the Erie
doctrine, the federal courts must follow state law regarding the limited appearance, id. at
452; Kaplan, Amendments of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 77 Harv. L. Rev.
601, 627-28 (1964); Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L.
Rev. 337, 379-80 (1961).
98. See Note, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 329, 339-40 (1940), 2 Moore, Federal Practice ff71 2.13,
at 1064-65 (2d ed. 1964); Blume, Actions Quasi In Ren Under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C.,
50 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 22-24 (1951).
99. For a recent defense of the "humanitarian doctrine" of limited appearance, see
Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 337, 379
(1961); cf. Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 Calif. L. Rev. 44, 60-61, 69 (1962).
100. Taintor, Foreign Judgment in Rem: Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in
Personam, 8 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 223 228-33 (1942); Note, Developments in the Law-State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 953-54 (1960). But see Restatement, Judgments
§ 40, comment a (1942); Note, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 441, 447-49 (1963).
101. Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909,
954 (1960).
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forcefully suggests that the denial of a limited appearance imposes an uncon-
stitutional condition on a non-resident defendant's right to protect his attached
property. The denial has this effect where defendant is forced to defend his
property at the price of submitting to personal jurisdiction in a state with
which he lacks contacts other than the presence of his property. These contacts
are reduced to the merest shadow in the case of the garnishment of a debt,
based on the fortuitous presence of a non-resident defendant's debtor within
the state.
Even if, at this juncture, constitutional arguments about the outer limits
of in rent jurisdiction are speculative it would have been preferable to avoid
the risk of head-on collisions with constitutional law by leaving the matter
to judicial ad hoc determination. If the draftsmen looked to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to reduce the danger of constitutional embarrassments,
they may have been overly optimistic. It will not be easy to persuade the
judges of New York to shed promptly the self-denying limitations by which
they have circumscribed the scope of that doctrine.
Finally, it may be observed that as New York is turning its back on the
doctrine of limited appearance, the Europeans appear to show "a growing
appreciation of the value of the concept of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction."'102 This
contrasting trend is all the more noteworthy when it is recalled that several
continental jurisdictions have pursued to its limit the notion of basing un-
restricted in personam jurisdiction on the mere presence of defendant's assets.1
3
III. SUBSIDIARY PROBLEMS
A. Appearance in Actions Commenced by
Service of Summons Without Complaint
Should a plaintiff be permitted to commence a lawsuit by service of a
summons unaccompanied by a complaint? The question has led to sharp
disagreements between theorists and practitioners. Starting a lawsuit without
giving the defendant any inkling of the nature and extent of the claim
asserted offends basic notions of fairness and the principle of due notice
which lie at the bottom of all orderly procedure. When the Advisory Com-
mittee prepared its original draft in 1957, it frowned upon "the indiscriminate
use of the summons as a negotiating device."' 0 4 The Committee discounted any
real need for it in view of the simplicity of modern complaints and the freedom
to amend them. The potential of the device for abuse and its wastefulness
where it is not followed by a complaint have been stressed. 0 5 One should add
102. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, XXtz Century Comparative and
Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema, 321, 332 (Nadelmann, von
Mehren and Hazard, eds. 1961).
103. Id. at 328-32.
104. 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 60 (1957). The tentative draft of proposed Rule 26.02,
the precursor of Rule 3012(a), provided that "the complaint shall be served with the
summons." Ibid.
105. 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, 11 301.202. See also Weinstein,
Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 72-73 (1960).
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that the device creates numerous technical problems as the later discussion will
show.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in emergencies the use of
the summons without complaint may be helpful. The Advisory Committee's
stricture that "if an attorney has insufficient information to draft a complaint
he ought not to begin the action"' 0 6 overlooks the practicalities of life. An
attorney may be away from his office when he learns of the defendant's tem-
porary presence in the jurisdiction. The time consumed in preparing a com-
plaint might make the difference between using or losing an opportunity to
obtain personal jurisdiction of a non-resident. As long as we adhere for better
or for worse to the doctrine of "transient jurisdiction,' 10 7 "we might as well
enable the lawyer to use it." To write out a summons in longhand takes only
minutes; not so to prepare even "a simple emergency complaint." Moreover,
articulating the grievances in a pleading often embitters the atmosphere and
dims the hope for a settlement. The service of a summons without complaint
avoids this undesirable side effect; yet, it evidences the claimant's determination
to press his claim. This is true not only in matrimonial and commercial cases,
as has been recognized, 08 but quite often also in tort litigation of a more
"personal" nature, such as libel, assault and battery, and false imprisonment.
The Advisory Committee's proposal to require the service of a summons
and complaint was not the first of its kind. At least once before in New York's
legislative history, a similar proposal had been made. The 1848 draft of the
Field Code required the service of a summons and complaint in all actions. 00
This was a deliberate departure from the practice under the Revised Statutes
which authorized starting an action at law by means which did not plainly
indicate to the defendant what the claim was." 0 The Commissioners on Practice
and Pleading in making their recommendations, as in many other instances,
followed equity practice under which the bill served with a subpoena gave the
defendant clear notice of the nature and particulars of the claim asserted."'
The Commissioners' proposal was enacted in 1848,112 but the change was
short-lived. Only one year later, the Code was amended to permit starting
an action by service of a summons without complaint.11 3 The Commissioners'
plea in their Final Report to the Legislature in 1850 to restore the substance
of the original Code provision remained unheeded. 114 The provision permitting
106. 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 60 (1957).
107. See Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflicts of Laws, Some Comments on
Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. Pub. L. 313 (1960). But see
Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 103-06, 119 (1962); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rile of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956).
108. 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, g 3012.02.
109. First Rep. Comm'rs on Prac. and P1., N.Y. 131-33 (1848).
110. See id. at 131-32 (1848).
111. Ibid.
112. N.Y. Code of Proc. §§ 106, 109 (1848).
113. N.Y. Code of Proc. § 130 (1849).
114. Final Rep. Comm'rs on Prac. and P1., N.Y. (Ass. Doc. No. 16) at 259, 256 (1858).
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service of the summons without complaint remained in the Code 15 and was
continued by the Code of Civil Procedure" 6 without material change. It
appeared again in the Civil Practice Act.117 When in 1957 the Advisory
Committee prepared its original draft of rules of pleading it took a new look
at the old problem. It proposed that, save in matrimonial actions, the com-
plaint be served with a summons.1 18 However, the proposal was abandoned in
the face of determined opposition by the Bar." 9 The Advisory Committee's
1961 Advance Draft returned to the basic features of the former practice.
20
Thus New York has remained with the minority of states which permit this
practice.' 2 1 However, in restoring the old law several significant changes were
made. Some were deliberate; others, probably unintentional, can only be ex-
plained by the draftsmen's haste in re-writing the law to reflect the policy
decision made in the final stages of the new Practice Act. These changes and
their consequences merit brief discussion.
1. Demand for Complaint
Under the former practice, in an action commenced by service of a sum-
mons without complaint, two steps were required to avoid a default: (a) service
of a notice of appearance; and (b) a demand for service of the complaint.
Both steps were time-limited (20 days),122 In restoring the former practice
the CPLR eliminated the time limitation for the demand.' 2 3 The only explana-
tion for the change given in the Advisory Committee's 1961 Advance Draft
was the cryptic statement that the time limitation is "omitted as unnecessary;
time to appear is covered by Rule [320(a)]."124 It is true that a defendant
115. N.Y. Code of Proc. § 130 (1851).
116. N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 416, 419, 479 (1877).
117. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 218, 257 (1921).
118. See 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 60-61 (1957).
119. See Minutes of Meetings and Reports of the Joint Committee on the Civil Prac-
tice Act (1959-1963) at 14. The Joint Committee represented the N.Y. State Bar Association,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers'
Association.
120. Final Report, N.Y. Adv. Comm. A-414-15 (Advance Draft 1961); Sen. Fin. Comm.
Rep. (Leg. Doc. No. 15) 417-18 (1961).
121. Colo. R. Civ. Prac. 3(a); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 223, § 16 (1955); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 231, § 11 (1956); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 509:4 (1955); N.Y. CPLR 304, 305,
3012; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-88 (1953); N.D. R. Civ. Prac. 3; Pa. R. Civ. Prac. 1007;
S.C. Code Ann. § 10-401 (1962); S.D. Code § 33-0803 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-201 (1955); Utah R. Civ. Proc. 3(a); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 651 (1958); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 4.28.010 (1962); W. Va. Rev. Code Ann. § 5529 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 262.02, 262.12 (Supp. 1965).
122. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 237.257.
123. Rule 3012(b) provides:
Demand for complaint. If the complaint is not served with the summons, the defend-
ant may serve a written demand for the complaint. If the complaint is not served
within twenty days after service of the demand, the court upon motion may dismiss
the action. A demand or motion under this section does not of itself constitute an
appearance in the action.
124. Final Rep. N.Y. Adv. Comm. A-415 (Advance Draft 1961); Sen. Fin. Comm. Rep.
(Leg. Doc. No. 15) 418 (1961).
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who has been served with a summons unaccompanied by a complaint should
not be exposed to a double risk of default, that is, for failure to appear timely
and, in addition, for failure to make a timely demand for the complaint.'2"
The unfairness of the second risk of a default was sharpened by the wording
of the summons which gave no inkling of a time limitation for demanding
the complaint.126 On the other hand, the solution adopted by the legislature is
far from ideal. Perhaps it would have been better to require the defendant
served with a summons without complaint either to appear or to serve a
demand for the complaint within the time prescribed for answering the com-
plaint; next, to provide that a demand for the complaint extends the time to
appear; 127 and, finally, to place the burden of serving the complaint, after
defendant's timely appearance, on the plaintiff without requiring any demand
for it by the defendant. It should be incumbent upon the plaintiff who selected
this anomalous mode of starting an action to follow automatically with the
service of the complaint once the defendant has appeared timely in the action.
125. See Stokes v. Schildknecht, 85 App. Div. 602, 83 N.Y. Supp. 358 (1st Dep't 1903).
126. Former N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac. 45 contained the following form of a summons:
You are hereby summoned to answer the complaint in this action and to serve a
copy of your answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this summons, to serve
a notice of appearance, on the plaintiff's attorney within twenty days after the serv-
ice of this summons, exclusive of the day of service. In case of your failure to appear
or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded
in the complaint.
127. Under present and former law a defendant who wants to see the complaint before
deciding whether to appear or to default faces the problem of avoiding a default for failure
to appear timely. One writer suggests that the defendant by demanding the complaint within
the time allowed by Rule 320(b) for a timely appearance (20 or 30 days) extends the time
to appear. He in effect argues that the time limitation fixed by Rule 320(b) is qualified by
Rule 3012 (b) which permits a demand without making an appearance. Siegel, Practice Com-
mentary to McKinney's CPLR, § 3012(b) at 35 (Supp. 1964). However, there is nothing in
the former Civ. Prac. Act § 257 as amended in 1951 (from which Rule 3012(b) is derived),
or in the present law to indicate a legislative intent that a demand for the complaint extends
the time to appear or answer. The draftsmen of N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 257, as amended, were
not concerned with the risk of a default. That risk could be avoided by a stipulation or an
order extending the time to appear. Nor was it their main concern to preserve defendant's
right to choose between raising a jurisdictional objection or defaulting. The thrust of that
section was to reject expressly the rule of Muslusky v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 225 N.Y. 584,
122 N.E. 461 (1919), which denied a defendant the right to demand the complaint unless he
had appeared generally. That rule was a serious threat to a defendant served with a summons
alone because he had to appear generally in order to be able to demand the complaint; and,
by appearing generally, he waived any objection to the exercise of jurisdiction over his
person or property. Later cases weakened the authority of the MUslusky case by sanctioning
a special appearance to demand the complaint. The 1951 amendment of Civ. Prac. Act § 257
finally gave legislative recognition to the principle that a demand for the complaint is neither
a general nor even a special appearance. The Judicial Council stated the legislative policy
underlying that amendment: "Were it to be held that a later objection that the defendant is
a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the court . . . would not be waived merely by
making a general appearance in the action, there would be no need to amend Section 257."
16 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 185, 217 (1950). There is case law to the effect that a demand
for the complaint does not prevent a default for failure to appear. See Renwal Products,
Inc. v. Kleen-Stik Products, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 645, 251 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See
also 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, 111 3211.05, 3215.19. Therefore the
defendant is well advised to err on the side of caution when demanding the complaint; he
should either stipulate for an extension of the time to appear or obtain an order to that effect.
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2. Summons witl Notice
When a plaintiff started a contract action for a liquidated amount without
serving a complaint, former Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Practice authorized
him to state the amount for which he would take judgment in case of default. 28
With this notice, judgment by default could be entered by the clerk without
application to the court; without the notice, an application was necessary.
129
When the Revisers reinstated the practice of starting an action by service
of a summons without complaint they continued the former notice practice.
In fact, they enlarged it by permitting it in all actions "for a sum certain or
for a sum which can by computation be made certain."'130 However, due to an
apparent oversight the notice no longer serves merely to facilitate the entry
of a judgment by default. It may in addition have become a novel prerequisite
for the entry of a default judgment where the summons was served without
complaint and defendant did not demand it. This curious result was produced
by the wording of Section 3215(e) which regulates the proof when a judgment
by default is applied for. As drafted originally, that section required the
applicant to file proof of service of the summons and complaint and proof
by affidavit of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount
due.131 When the practice of starting an action by service of a summons
without complaint was restored, Section 3215(e) was re-written to authorize
the entry of a default judgment upon proof of service of the summons and
complaint or of a summons with notice. 32 However, the draftsmen apparently
overlooked the possibility that an action may be commenced by service of a
summons without notice. The defendant in that case might appear, but make
no demand for the complaint; or he might default by failing to appear without
ever having demanded the complaint. Under pre-CPLR decisions plaintiff could
not serve a complaint unless the defendant had demanded it. 3 3 If these
128. Former N.Y. Rules Civ. Proc. 46 provided:
Notice with summons demanding money judgment. If an action be brought for the
breach of an express contract to pay absolutely, or on a contingency, a sum or sums
of money fixed by the terms of the contract, or capable of being ascertained there-
from by computation only; or on an express or implied contract to pay money
received or disbursed, or for the value of property delivered, or for services rendered
by, to, or for the use of, the defendant or a third person; and the complaint be not
served with the summons, the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice stating
the sum of money for which judgment will be taken in case of default.
129. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 485; see Everitt v. Everitt, 4 N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891,
171 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958).
130. Rule 305(b) provides:
Summons and notice. If the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which
can by computation be made certain, and the complaint is not served with the sum-
mons, the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice stating the sum of money
for which judgment will be taken in case of default.
131. See tentative Rule 31.6(e), 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 98 (1957).
132. Rule 3215(e), so far as here material, provides:
Proof. On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof of
service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Rule 305, and proof by affidavit of the facts constituting the
claim, the default and the amount due.
133. Gluckselig v. H. Michaelyan, Inc., 132 Misc. 783, 230 N.Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct.
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decisions are still good law, the defendant could stop the progress of the
action simply by failing to demand the complaint. Since in that event plaintiff
could not present the proof required by Rule 3215(e), he would have no choice
but to discontinue the action' 34 or, as has been suggested, 1'5 move to compel
the defendant to accept the complaint. Fortunately, it is quite doubtful that
the former law still controls. It has been argued 8 6 that the cases decided under
the Civil Practice Act carried little persuasive force even under the former law;
their strength was further weakened when the former time limit for making
a demand for the complaint was eliminated.187 A simple solution therefore
would be to permit the plaintiff to serve the complaint on a defendant who has
appeared, whether or not he demanded it. Service could be made in accordance
with the usual provisions for service of pleadings upon a party who has
appeared. As a practical matter, defendant in most instances will appear by an
attorney who could be served by mail.
38
This leaves open the question of how to deal with a defendant who after
service of a summons without notice, unaccompanied by a complaint, simply
defaulted. Had defendant demanded the complaint, he would have authorized,
expressly or at least by implication, service of the complaint by mail to the
address stated in the notice of appearance. However, in the absence of an appear-
ance or demand, this mode of service would be of questionable validity. Section
3012(a), after stating that a complaint "may" be served with a summons,
provides that a "subsequent" pleading asserting a "new" or "additional"
1928), aff'd mern., 225 App. Div. 666, 231 N.Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dep't 1928). Everett v.
Everett, 150 Misc. 609, 269 N.Y. Supp. 833 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Crouse v. Reichert, 61 Hun. 46,
15 N.Y. Supp. 369 (4th Dep't 1891). "The complaint may be served either with the summons
or after the defendant has served his demand. The plaintiff has no right to serve a copy of
the complaint after the service of the summons, and before the service of the demand by the
defendant." 3 Carmody's N.Y. Practice § 1118, at 2462 (1930).
134. Rule 3217.
135. 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, Uf 3012.03.
136. 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 3012.03. See also 4 id., ff
3215.19.
137. See text accompanying note 123, supra.
138. Rule 2103(b) (2) and (c). The Rule, as far as here pertinent, provides:
Service of papers.
* * *
(b) Upon an attorney. Except where otherwise prescribed by law or order of
court, papers to be served upon a party in a pending action shall be served on his
attorney .... Such service upon an attorney shall be made: ...
1. by delivering the paper to him personally; or
2. by mailing the paper to him at the address designated by him for that pur-
pose, or, if none is designated, at his last known address . . . or
3. if his office is open, by leaving the paper with a person in charge, . . . or
4. by leaving it at his residence within the state with a person of suitable age
and discretion. Service upon an attorney shall not be made at his residence
unless service at his office cannot be made.
(c) Upon a party. If a party has not appeared by an attorney or his attorney
cannot be served, service shall be upon the party himself by a method specified in
paragraph one, two or four of subdivision (b).
(d) Filing. If a paper cannot be served by any of the methods specified in sub-
division (b) and (c), service may be made by filing the paper as if it were a paper
required to be filed.
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claim for relief shall be served on a party who has not appeared in the manner
provided for service of a summons. It further provides that "in any other
case" a pleading shall be served in the manner provided for service of papers
generally. 139 It could perhaps be argued that a complaint served after service
of a summons without complaint is not a "subsequent" pleading, because there
was no "prior" pleading, and that it does not assert a "new" or "additional"
claim, because there was no "old" or "original" claim. Therefore, the argument
would run, the second sentence of the subdivision applies which permits service
"in any other case" in the manner provided for service of papers generally.
This literal construction, however, would do violence to the spirit of the statute.
While it does not explicitly cover the situation under discussion, the provision
clearly seeks to distinguish between defendants who did appear and those
who did not.140 In the absence of an appearance, service of the complaint in
the manner of a summons affords a defendant reasonable notice of the nature
of the claim asserted against him. This holds true whether plaintiff asserts a
"new" or "additional" claim or the original claim after service of a simple
summons.
Even service of the complaint on a defaulting defendant in person without
the state in the manner provided for serving a summons might not always be
sufficient. A constitutional question is presented where defendant is a non-
resident transient whose only contact with the state was his temporary presence
at the moment when the summons without complaint was served upon him.
The requirement of a reasonable basis for jurisdiction over a non-resident
would be reduced to a meaningless gesture if service of a summons without any
indication of the nature of the claim and the relief sought were deemed sufficient
to satisfy due process requirements under the "transient" rule of jurisdiction.
Regardless of whether or not procedural acrobatics of the kind described
above permit escape from the trap which the present statutory scheme has
created, clearly the trap itself should be removed. A party who starts an action
should not be confronted with formidable technical problems when he seeks
to enter judgment against a defaulting defendant. This does not necessarily
mean that a return to the former practice would be desirable. For it permitted
139. Section 3012(a), so far as here pertinent, provides:
Service of pleadings. The complaint may be served with the summons. A subsequent
pleading asserting new or additional claims for relief shall be served upon a party
who has not appeared in the manner provided for service of a summons. In any
other case, a pleading shall be served in the manner provided for service of papers
generally ....
Cf. tentative Rule 26.2 (the precursor of present Rule 3012(a)) which, so far as pertinent
here, provided:
Except in an action for a separation, annulment, dissolution or divorce, the com-
plaint shall be served with the summons. A subsequent pleading asserting new or
additional claims for relief shall be served upon a party who has not appeared in the
manner provided for service of a summons. Every other pleading shall be served
upon the attorney for each of the parties or upon the party himself, if he has not
appeared by an attorney .... 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 60 (1957).
140. Rules 3012(a); 2103(e). See 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2,
ffff 3012.04, 3012.06.
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entry of a default judgment against a non-appearing defendant served merely
with a summons, without any notice of the nature of the claim asserted against
him.141 One possible solution would be to require in every case service of a
summons and complaint or at least a summons with notice.142 This would be
a compromise between the present law and the Advisory Committee's original
proposal to require a summons and complaint in all cases save matrimonial
action where a summons with notice was permitted.143 The compulsory notice
would satisfy basic notions of fairness; at the same time it would relieve the
plaintiff of the necessity to prepare a complaint in every case. Appropriate forms
for the notice in the more common types of actions could easily be drafted if
and when the long awaited official forms are forthcoming.' 44 An alternative
solution proposed by the Judicial Conference permits, but does not require,
the plaintiff to endorse in every case a notice upon the summons. 145 To be sure,
the latter solution will continue the present trap for the uninitiated, but it will
at least enable the informed lawyer to avoid it whenever he expects a default.
B. Timing of Jurisdictional Objections
1. Timing of Defendant's Objections
When the CPLR was enacted in 1962 it contained inconsistent provisions
for the timing of jurisdictional objections. Rule 320(b) and (c) then directed
141. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 489; Rules Civ. Proc. 189. Application to the court was
required in that case, Malone v. Citarella, 7 A.D.2d 871, 182 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1959).
See 7 Carmody-Wait Cyc. N.Y. Prac. 266 (1953).
142. Cf. Iowa, Rules Civ. P. 50, providing for a notice which "shall contain a general
statement of the cause or the causes of action and the relief demanded, and, if for money
the amount thereof" where a petition is not attached to the original notice. See also N.Y,
Uniform District Court Act § 1402, N.Y. Uniform City Court Act § 1402 and New York
City Civil Court Act § 1402 (permitting entry of a default judgment on the basis of a
summons and complaint or a summons "stating the amount for which the plaintiff will
take judgment if the defendant fails to appear and answer, and containing a statement
of the nature and substance of the cause of action.")
143. See supra note 118.
144. Sen. Intr. 27, Pr. 4382, pp. 6, 8-10, 11 (1961) provided for promulgation of an
appendix of forms. The provision was struck from the final version of the CPLR, see 6 Sen.
Fin. Comm. Rep. (Leg. Doc. No. 8) 33 (1962), and 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cl.
supra note 2, ff 305.02, 3 id. f1 3013.09.
145. Proposed amended Rule 305(b) would read as follows:
Summons and notice. If the complaint is not served with the summons, the sum-
mons may contain or have attached thereto a notice stating the object of the action
and the relief sought, and, in an action for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
computation be made certain, the sum of money for which judgment will be taken
in case of default.
Report of the N.Y. Judicial Conference to the 1965 Legislature, Proposal No. 1, at 61. The
amendment will become effective on September 1, 1965 unless it is disapproved by the 1965
Legislature. N.Y. judiciary Law § 229.
The judicial Conference further recommended amending Section 3215(e) to authorize
entry of a default judgment also on the basis of service of a summons and notice under
Rule 316(a). That notice is published together with the summons when service is made
by publication. It indicates the object of the action and, when real property is involved,
briefly describes it. See Report of the N.Y. Judicial Conference to the 1965 Legislature,
at 90-91. Finally, the Conference recommended conforming amendments to subd. (a) and
(b) of Section 3215 to cover the case when an action has been started by service of a
summons without complaint. Bills implementing these recommendations have been intro-
duced in the current session of the N.Y. Legislature.
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the pleader to raise objections to jurisdiction over the person or property by
motion or in the answer "at the time of appearance."'1 46 This requirement
seemed to conflict with Rule 3211 under which one or more of enumerated
objections and defenses may be raised either lby motion or included in the
answer at the pleader's option.147 The Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1957
draft of that Rule emphasized the flexibility of the procedure: "the party will
lose no rights by failing to move or to include all available grounds in his
motion, for he still may assert in his answer or reply any defenses or objections
not raised by motion."' 48 However, the 1957 draft Rule did not as yet provide
for objections to the court's jurisdiction over the person or property of the
defendant. When the Revisers added such a provision in 1958 they explained
its effect in these words:
As under Federal Rule 12(b), the pleader is given the option of
raising the defense by motion or in the answer, but he waives the
the objection by failure to raise it by either method. If raised by
motion, it must be joined with the other objections specified in Rule
[3211(a)].1
49
Undoubtedly the Revisers intended to emphasize the principle that only
one pre-answer motion under Rule 3211 is permissible; 150 therefore, if the
defendant wants to raise a jurisdictional objection by a pre-answer motion
he must join it with any other objections which he desires to raise in that
fashion. However, if he fails to raise the jurisdictional objection by motion
he may still plead it as an affirmative defense in his answer. This interpretation
accords with the Advisory Committee's views as expressed in 1957 and with
the plain wording of Rule 3211 (e). Furthermore, it is in harmony with Rule 320
as drafted in 1960. The words "at the time of the appearance" were not con-
tained in the original draft of the Rule, but were inserted in subdivisions
(b) and (c) during the final evolution of the CPLR in 1961.151 According to
the Advisory Committee's Notes the added words sought to make it clear that
the defendant cannot raise the jurisdictional objections "as an afterthought
in his answer or by motion."' 52 The insertions were called mere "language
changes to clarify meaning."' 53 They were not even mentioned among the
146. See Rule 320(b) and (c) quoted supra note 57. The phrase "at the time of
appearance" was eliminated from subdivision (b) by a 1964 amendment. See text infra p. 402.
147. See Rule 3211(e) quoted supra note 57.
148. 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 87 (1957).
149. 2 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 152-53 (1958). Note, however, that Fed. R. Civ. P.
12 (g) requires the pleader to include in the motion all objections "then available to him."
On the controversial construction of that Rule see supra note 41. See 4 Weinstein, Korn &
Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 3211.05: "[The Advisory Committee] . . . included these
objections in Rule 3211(a) and proposed that they be treated in every respect in the same
way as the other three enumerated."
150. 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 86-87 (1957).
151. Final N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. A-310 (Advance Draft 1961); Sen. Fin. Comm.
Rep. (Leg. Doc. No. 15) 280 (1961).
152. Sen. Fin. Comm. Rep. (Leg. Doc. No. 8) 280 (1961).
153. Ibid.
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more important changes listed in the introductory note to the Advance Draft
of the Advisory Committee's Final Report.'5 4 However, despite its innocuous
billing, the change was one of substance and came close to a revival of the
special appearance practice; for it required the defendant to voice his juris-
dictional objections at the threshold of the litigation when he may not even
know whether he has a valid ground for objecting. For example, a defendant
who appears by making a corrective motion after service of an incomprehensible
complaint may not be able to determine whether he has a jurisdictional
objection until he has seen a properly drafted pleading.15
For actions in personam, the problem posed by Rule 320 was solved by a
1961 amendment which deleted the words "at the time of appearance" from
subdivision (b). However, subdivision (c), governing the effect of an appear-
ance in in rem actions remains unchanged. There the defendant still must
raise the jurisdictional objections "at the time of appearance." As to the timing
of these objections there is no sound reason for differentiating between actions
in personam and actions in rem. As already noted, a cautious pleader, who is
aware of the uncertain scope of these objections, may wish, in a proper case, to
base his objections upon lack of both personal and in rem jurisdiction.'"0
He should not be plagued by incongruous timing provisions in addition to
other difficult procedural problems. 15 Commendably a proposed amendment
deleting the words "at the time of appearance" from subdivision (c) has been
adopted by the Judicial Conference. 158
The Conference also considered the problem of a belated assertion of
jurisdictional objections. To permit a defendant to raise non-jurisdictional
objections and defenses by motion and then, in the event of defeat, to present,
for the first time, jurisdictional objections in his answer runs counter to a
strong policy favoring their disposition ahead of other defenses and objections.
A court should not be placed in a position where it must determine issues going
to the merits only to learn later that it had no jurisdiction over the defendant
and therefore must dismiss the complaint. Assume, for example, that a defend-
ant in an action on a promissory note has a questionable defense of payment
and a solid defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. He might raise the defense
of payment by making a motion for accelerated judgment under Rule
154. See Final N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. A-112-114. (Advance Draft 1961); Sen, Fin,
Comm. Rep. (Leg. Doc. No. 15) 10-13 (1961).
155. Rule 3024. See also 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 3211.05,
discussing defendant's dilemma under former Rule 320(b) when he was served with a
summons without notice.
156. See 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, Iff1 3211.10, 3211.18-3211.22.
157. The lack of symmetry between Rule 320(b) and (c) frustrates in effect the pur-
pose of the 1964 amendment of Rule 320(b); for the defendant will always strive to keep
within the shorter time limitation of subdivision (c) when he combines objections to jurisdic-
tion over his person and over his property.
158. See Rep. N.Y. Judicial Conference to the 1965 Legislature, App. B, 2, Proposal
No. 3; see also id. at 62. The amendment will become effective on September 1, 1965 unless
disapproved by the legislature, N.Y. Judiciary Law § 229.
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3211(a)(5)."5' If after trial of the issue of payment under Rule 3211(c)
judgment were rendered for the defendant he would never raise the jurisdictional
objection.'" However, if the defendant were unsuccessful he could, after denial
of the motion, raise that objection in his answer and have the complaint dis-
missed. If in our hypothetical case plaintiff thereafter instituted a second
action in this or another jurisdiction questions of res judicata and estoppel
would be presented. Assume that the defendant again pleads payment as a
defense. A strong argument could be made that the doctrine of res judicata
would not preclude a re-litigation of that issue since a decision made by a
court without jurisdiction over the defendant is void.161 Furthermore, the hold-
ing against the defendant on the issue of payment was unnecessary in view
of the eventual dismissal of the action. Thus defendant would get two bites
at the proverbial apple unless, by litigating the issue of payment without
apprising the court or the opponent of his objection (while he intended to avail
himself of the benefit of a favorable determination), he were estopped from
resisting plaintiff's reliance on res judicata. It is arguable that by his conduct
the defendant consented to the exercise of jurisdiction at least with respect
to the issue of payment.
1 6 2
One writer, repeating a suggestion which emerged from panel discussions
at a recent trial judges' seminar, proposes amendments to Rule 320(b) and (c)
which would require jurisdictional objections to be asserted by motion or in
the answer "whichever shall occur first."' 63 The Judicial Conference found
a different solution. It proposed to change the timing provision of Rule 3211 (e)
by providing that a defendant, who makes a pre-answer motion under Rule
3211 on any ground, waives objections to jurisdiction over his person or
property which he has not included in his motion.' 64 Thus a recurrence of
159. Rule 3211(c) authorizes the court to order an immediate trial of the issues raised
on the motion to dismiss.
160. The judgment, of course, would bar any future claim on the same cause of action
and preclude relitigation of the issue of payment under the doctrine of collateral estoppel in
a subsequent suit between the parties on a different cause of action. Restatement, Judg-
ments §§ 52, 68 (1942).
161. E.g., Kamp v. Kamp, 59 N.Y. 212, 216 (1874). Restatement, Judgments §§ 5, 6,
14 (1942).
162. See Restatement, Judgments § 18 (1942). Cf. Beck, Estoppel Against Inconsistent
Positions in Judicial Proceedings, 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 245, 250, 251 (1940).
163. See McLaughlin, 1964 Survey of New York Law, Adjective Law, 16 Syracuse L.
Rev. 419, 423 (1965).
164. See Report of the N.Y. Judicial Conference to the 1965 Legislature, App. B, 4, 5,
Proposals Nos. 3 and 6; see also id. at 66, 67. The amendments will become effective on
September 1, 1965, unless they are disapproved by the 1965 Legislature. N.Y. Judiciary Law
§ 229. Rule 3211(e), so far as here pertinent would provide:
Any objection or defense based upon a ground set forth in paragraph one, three,
four, five and six of subdivision (a) is waived unless raised either by such motion or
in the responsive pleading .... A motion based upon a ground specified in para-
graphs two, seven or ten of subdivision (a) may be made ...at any subsequent
time or in a later pleading, if one is permitted. An objection based upon a ground
specified in paragraphs eight or nine of subdivision (a) is waived if a party moves
on any of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) without raising such objection or
if, having made no motion under subdivision (a), he does not raise such objection
in the responsive pleading ....
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
an inconsistency between Rule 320(b) and (c) and Rule 3211(e) was
averted.16 5 The amendment would remove the mischief of a defendant's
raising objections as an afterthought while it steers clear of any tie-in between
his appearance and the timing of jurisdictional objections. A cross-reference
in Rule 320 would alert the pleader to the existence of the waiver provisions
in Rule 3211(e) .166 The amendment also avoids the problems of statutory
construction which have arisen under the corresponding provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.O'T
The policy against the belated assertion of jurisdictional objections applies
with equal force to defenses in abatement which never enjoyed high favor. 108
A party should not be able to seek the dismissal of a claim on formal grounds
after waging an unsuccessful contest on the merits. Hence thought should be
given to an amendment which would expand the newly adopted jurisdictional
waiver provision to other dilatory pleas enumerated in Rule 3211(a). 100
2. Balancing Plaintiff's and Defendant's Right to Obtain Disposition of
Jurisdictional Objections
Rule 3211(b) provides that a party may move for a judgment dismissing
one or more defenses on the ground that a defense is not stated. Practitioners at
the present time are using this provision for motions to strike jurisdictional
objections in the answer without awaiting the trial of the action. Some cases
approved this practice 70 although there is doubt as to whether subdivision (b)
applies in that situation,' 71 A jurisdictional defense in the answer may cause
grave concern to the plaintiff. Unless he can move to dispose of it he would
not know whether the court has jurisdiction over the defendant until the case
is tried. This may be months or even years after the action is started. There
is a serious danger that the cause of action may be barred by the statute of
limitations if the court eventually dismisses the complaint for insufficient
service.1 72 Obviously the interests of plaintiff and defendant in the disposition
165. See text accompanying notes 146, 147, supra.
166. See Report of the N.Y. Judicial Conference to the 1965 Legislature, App. B, 1, 2,
Proposals Nos. 2 and 3.
167. See supra note 41.
168. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 488, 495, 498, 499 (1877); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 237. See
Clark, Code Pleading, 500, 507 (2d ed. 1947); 4 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra
note 2, 1111 3211.04, 3211.05.
169. Rule 3211(a) (3) (4) (6) (incapacity, another action pending, counterclaim not
properly interposed).
170. Kukoda v. Schneider, 41 Misc. 2d 308, 245 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See
also Vazzana v. Horn, 42 Misc. 2d 989, 249 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
171. Rule 3211(a)(7) and (b) was added to the tentative draft in 1961 since the
motions were thought often to "perform a valuable function in permitting a party to have a
defective pleading dismissed before being required to frame a responsive pleading and perhaps
to submit to disclosure proceedings unjustifiably extended by the scope of the defective
pleading." Sen. Fin. Comm. Rep. (Leg. Doc. No. 15) 483 (1961). See id. at 484; 4 Wein-
stein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, 1111 3211.39, 3211.42, 3212.02. See also Vazzana v.
Horn, supra note 170.
172. The danger is ever-present despite Section 205, at least, where the action was
dismissed for insufficiency of process or service. See Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140
N.E. 938 (1923); Knox v. Beckford, 167 Misc. 200, 3 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Albany City Ct. 1938),
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of jurisdictional objections should be fairly balanced. The Judicial Conference
has now proposed an amendment to subdivision (b) of Rule 3211 which
authorizes a pre-answer motion for judgment dismissing a defense on the
ground that "it has no merit.'1 73 The amendment is broad enough to include
jurisdictional objections; it clarifies beyond doubt plaintiff's right to move for
disposition of jurisdictional defenses ahead of the trial. It should be noted that
on a motion of this kind the court may order immediate trial of any factual
issues.174 In contrast, if after joinder of issue plaintiff moved for summary
judgment under Rule 3212 the court under the Rule's present wording would
have to deny the motion if any issue of fact other than the amount of the
damages required a trial.1
7 5
3. Jurisdictional Threshold Motions
The CPLR has been criticized for its failure to authorize a jurisdictional
threshold motion. It has been suggested that the defendant should be permitted,
but not required, to raise jurisdictional issues by a motion which may be made
before an omnibus motion for an accelerated judgment under Rule 3211.176
The threshold motion thus has been envisioned as a qualification of the much
heralded "one-motion-only" rule which is now in force.177 Those who oppose
the present practice point out that requiring the defendant to assemble all
available grounds in the omnibus motion may make his task of preparing and
briefing the motion unduly burdensome. If his jurisdictional objections are
successful he has wasted his efforts on all of the other grounds on which the
motion is based. 78 Nevertheless the arguments favoring a preliminary juris-
dictional motion lack persuasive force. If a separate appeal from a denial of
the threshold motion were allowed it would seriously weaken the policy against
delaying tactics through multiple appeals. On the other hand, to defer an
appeal from a denial of the motion until a later omnibus motion has been deter-
mined or the time for the motion has expired, would impair the usefulness of the
preliminary motion. The defendant would be compelled either to brief the omni-
bus motion promptly after the threshold motion has been determined and before
the jurisdictional objections have been finally adjudicated; or else to forego the
threshold motion completely. Moreover, the common characteristic ofthe various
grounds on which the omnibus motion may be based (other than failure to state
aff'd mern., 258 App. Div. 823, 15 N.Y.S.2d 174, aff'd, 285 N.Y. 762, 34 N.E.2d 174 (1941).
See also 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 205.10, 205.11.
173. See Rep. N.Y. Judicial Conference to the 1965 Legislature, App. B, at 4, Proposal
No. 5; see also id. at 65. The amendment will become effective on September 1, 1965 unless
disapproved by the legislature. See N.Y. judiciary Law § 229.
174. Rule 3211(c).
175. Rule 3212(b).
176. See Prof. Thornton's summary of discussions at the 1962 Crotonville Conference
of Supreme Court Trial justices, 8 Ann. Rep. N.Y. Judicial Conference 77-79 (1963);
McEneney, Motion Practice Under the CPLR, 9 Ann. Rep. N.Y. judicial Conference 186,
193-95 (1964).
177. Rule 3211(e): C... no more than one such motion shall be permitted."
178. See Prof. Thornton's report, supra note 176.
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a cause of action and defect of parties which in any event are non-waivable)
is that they are simple and comparatively easy to prove. In fact, defendant
should not resort to the motion unless this is the case. Therefore, it should
not cast too heavy a burden on the defendant to include all available grounds
in his pre-answer motion if he wishes to have them decided before he serves an
answer. If he fails to raise them in the omnibus motion he may still include
them in the answer and thereafter, in a proper case, move for summary judg-
ment. It is true, however, that, as already noted, present Rule 3212 governing
summary judgments does not permit the movant, as does Rule 3211, to ask for
an immediate trial of factual issues. Hence an amendment should be considered
which would broaden the court's power to order an immediate trial of disputed
questions of fact that arise on a motion for summary judgment; at least this
should be allowed in the court's discretion whenever this disposition would have
been proper, had the defendant made a pre-answer motion under Rule 3211.1'
C. Submission to Personal Jurisdiction through Proceeding with
the Defense in In Rem Actions
Finally, by eliminating both the special appearance and the limited
appearance the draftsmen of the CPLR have created an interesting problem
of procedural mechanics. As already noted, the defendant may appear and
raise jurisdictional objections along with defenses to the merits; but he cannot
contest the validity of an in rem claim and still confine an adverse adjudication
to its in rem effect.' 80 Accordingly, the Revisers had to fix the point in the
progress of an action at which the defendant by participating in the litigation
submits to personal jurisdiction if his jurisdictional objections are not sus-
tained. The CPLR fixed this point of no return at the moment when defendant
"proceeds with the defense."'' Specifically, Rule 320(c) provides that a
defendant in an action based on in rem jurisdiction does not submit to personal
jurisdiction by his appearance if he asserts an objection to in personam or
in rem jurisdiction by motion or in the answer "unless the defendant proceeds
with the defense after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the objection
is not ultimately sustained." Thus, a defendant who refrains from "proceeding
with the defense" may still default if his jurisdictional objection fails, and in
that manner confine the judgment to its in rem effect.' 8 2
What then is the meaning of the crucial phrase "proceeds with the defense
after asserting the objection to jurisdiction"? The answer, it would seem, is
provided by the function of a limited appearance and the purpose of the quoted
provision of Rule 320(c). If a limited appearance seeks to avoid conversion
179. It is doubtful whether the court may order an immediate trial of contested issues
of fact arising on a motion based on Rule 3211(a) (7) or 3211(b). See Weinstein, Korn &
Miller, op. cit. supra note 2, II 3211.51.
180. See text supra pp. 387-88.
181. See Homburger, Book Review, New York Civil Practice, Weinstein, Korn, Miller,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1222, 1234 (1964).
182. 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 189 (1960).
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of in rem jurisdiction into personal jurisdiction by defending the action on
the merits, 8 3 and if Rule 320(c) was enacted for the specific purpose of
denying any right to a limited appearance 8 4 the answer seems to follow
readily. Procedural steps taken solely for the purpose of contesting any part
of the claim on the merits should be deemed "proceeding with the defense."
On the other hand, procedural steps which may serve a purpose unrelated to a
contest on the merits should not be so considered. Therefore, service of a
notice of appearance after service of a summons without complaint or a demand
for change of venue followed by a motion for such change should not be
construed as proceeding with the defense since a defendant has the right to
take all steps necessary to avoid a default and to have the proper court pass
on his jurisdictional objection. Likewise, a defendant who asserted a juris-
dictional objection in his answer should be permitted to conduct an examination
before trial, file a note of issue and proceed to trial, provided only that he
confines these procedural activities to the jurisdictional issue and refrains from
contesting plaintiff's claim on the merits. Perhaps the defendant should even
be free to assert dilatory pleas which do not go to the merits of the claim,
but show that the action is not maintainable, such as lack of legal capacity to
sue or pendency of another action. Regardless of the merits of the claim
asserted, plaintiff should not be able to force a defendant to submit to personal
jurisdiction or to abandon his interest in the res by prosecuting an action which
is not maintainable.
It should be noted, however, that the Revisers carefully avoid defining
the precise meaning of the "limited appearance." They only speak of the
question "whether a defendant may make an appearance limited to contesting
an in rem claim without subjecting himself to personal jurisdiction."' 8 5 Thus
they explain the indefinite phrase "proceeding with the defense," used by the
Rule, by the equally indefinite phrase "contesting an in rem claim." Nor do
the Notes inform us whether the mere assertion of non-jurisdictional defenses
or objections in a motion or an answer constitutes "proceeding with the
defense." Construing the Rule literally it would seem that the mere assertion
of the jurisdictional objections in the answer or in a pre-answer motion does
not violate the prohibition against the limited appearance since only proceeding
with the defense after asserting the objections involves submission to personal
jurisdiction if the objection is not ultimately sustained. 186 However, it may
well be that the oral argument of defenses to the merits raised by a pre-answer
motion or the pleading of defenses to the merits in the answer after a pre-
183. See text supra p. 388.
184. 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 187-89 (1960). See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit.
supra note 2, i 320.18. But see Lenhoff, A New Procedural Code in New York, 13 Buffalo L.
Rev. 119, 128 (1963).
185. 4 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 187 (1960).
186. N.Y. Rule 320(c) provides that an appearance is not equivalent to personal
service of the summons upon the defendant if a jurisdictional objection is asserted "unless the
defendant proceeds with the defense after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the
objection is not ultimately sustained." See supra note 57.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
answer motion raising jurisdictional objections has been denied constitutes
"proceeding with the defense." The matter is not of great practical significance
since in most cases the defendant will make the decision whether to run the
risk of submission to personal jurisdiction before he answer or moves. If he
wishes to contain a judgment to its in rem aspects he will be well advised to
raise his jurisdictional objections by a motion which is limited strictly to that
issue. Should he change his mind after denial of the motion he can still proceed
with the defense having lost nothing except the opportunity to move again
under Rule 3211.
CONCLUSION
Praise is due to the Draftsmen of the CPLR for discarding the special ap-
pearance practice with its out-moded technicalities and artificial limitations. No
longer does defendant's general appearance in and of itself confer jurisdiction
over defendant's person. No longer need he, by a threshold motion, appearing
specially for that purpose, raise objections to the court's jurisdiction over his
person or property. Following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the CPLR
has changed fundamentally the concept of the appearance as well as its mechan-
ics. At the new law's core, it seems, lies the principle that by his appearance the
defendant gives the court power to determine the question of its own jurisdic-
tion. This is the essence of what is left of the old concept of consent and volun-
tary submission to jurisdiction implied from the act of appearance. However,
the court's power, acquired through the appearance, to adjudicate a dispute over
jurisdiction should not be confused with abandonment of jurisdictional objec-
tions. Under the new approach the rules governing appearance and the raising
of jurisdictional objections have been re-structured so that lack of jurisdiction
over defendant's person or property may be pleaded as an affirmative defense
in the answer or included in a pre-answer omnibus motion to dismiss the com-
plaint. A waiver of the objection results only from defendant's failure to assert
it seasonably in either of these two ways. Under an amendment proposed by
the Judicial Conference now pending before the legislature the policy favoring
an early disposition of jurisdictional objections would be strengthened. The
amendment provides that a defendant who makes a pre-answer omnibus mo-
tion based on any ground waives objections to in personam or in rem juris-
diction that are not included in it. Furthermore, the amendment expressly
sanctions plaintiff's right to move before trial for dismissal of a defense without
merit (including jurisdictional defenses) that is asserted in defendant's answer.
Technical shortcomings of the present law are due mainly to imperfect
integration into the statutory framework of the provisions authorizing an action
to be started without service of a complaint. A late policy decision to restore
this practice-originally rejected by the Revisers--apparently did not allow
enough time to make all necessary conforming changes. What happened serves
as an object lesson of the undesirable side effects frequently caused by piece-
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meal tampering with the balanced structure of an integrated system. Curative
amendments have been proposed by the Judicial Conference.
A flat prohibition against a limited appearance precluding non-residents
from a contest on the merits of in rem claims without submission to per-
sonal jurisdiction found its way into the CPLR without thorough explanation of
its background and the important policy decision underlying it. Statutory
certainty, beneficial as it may be, may have been bought at a high price. The
new rule is out of harmony with the restricted effect of an appearance in actions
based on New York's long-armed statute; it stifles' the natural growth of the
law in an area which has not yet reached the stage of maturity when an informed
choice between conflicting policy considerations is possible; and it excludes
New York's Bench and Bar from sharing in a pragmatic search for a rule
which satisfies theoretical and practical needs and, above all, the claims of
justice.
